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ABSTRACT 
Probabilistic Fragility of Interdependent Urban Systems Subjected to Seismic 
Hazards 
by 
Isaac Hernandez-Fajardo 
Urban service networks have come under increased pressure due to expansion 
of urban population, decrease of capital investment, growing interdependence, and 
man-made and natural hazards. 
This thesis introduces a simulation-based methodology for the estimation of the 
fragility of urban networks subjected to earthquake perturbation. The proposed In-
terdependent Fragility Assessment (IFA) algorithm abstracts the steps required for 
perturbation-induced damage propagation within and between networks through in-
ternal and interdependent links, respectively. Damage propagation uncertainty is 
accounted by considering conditional probabilities of failure for components and in-
terdependent strengths measuring the likelihood of intersystemic failure propagation. 
The IFA algorithm is used in four applications. The first application subjected two 
simplified models of real interdependent urban power and water networks to selected 
seismic scenarios. Test results showed that interdependence presence worsens systemic 
fragility, but that the features of interdependence effects were jointly influenced by 
local fragility properties and interdependence strengths. 
A second application examined the role of cascading failures caused by component 
overloading in systemic fragility. The results showed that cascading failures worsen 
interdependence fragility, and that mitigation actions improving local component 
capacity have limited effect on controlling interdependent-induced fragility. 
Two additional conceptual mitigation measures, component fragility reduction 
(CF R) and interdependence redundancy enhancement (IRE), were explored. CF R, 
decreases component seismic fragilities while IRE adds interdependence links to de-
pendent nodes. Test results showed that CF R outperforms IRE; however, their com-
bination achieved comparable fragility reductions. This outcome highlights the poten-
tial of synergistic mitigation policies in controlling interdependent systemic fragility. 
Finally, the IFA methodology was adapted to use a probabilistic seismic descrip-
tion for the estimation of unconditional systemic fragilities. The hazard description 
was obtained following an existing approach that uses importance sampling for the 
generation of intensity maps. The value of the hybrid methodology rests on its ca-
pacity to generate unconditional fragility estimates for direct use in risk assessment. 
Topics for future work include the development of more sophisticated models of 
cascading failure, the analysis of optimal mitigation actions using mitigation cost-
structures and life-cycle costs, the extension of the IFA methodology for perturbation 
such as hurricanes and flooding, and interdependent fragility studies of theoretical 
network models. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1 Motivation 
Urban networks, like power, water, gas, transportation, or telecommunication sys-
tems, are essential elements of the infrastructure of cities. The productivity and 
livelihood of corporations and people depend on their continuous operation, while 
their relevance to society becomes especially evident in the aftermath of strong natu-
ral (earthquake, hurricanes) or man-made (accidents, terrorism) perturbations (Davis 
et al., 2006; EERJ, 2010; Eidinger et al., 2010). 
In recent years, urban networks have found themselves under increased stress due 
to urban population growth (United Nations, 2009) (Fig. 1.1), service demand rise 
(International Energy Agency, 2010), and, in some countries, limited investment on 
expansion and maintenance (Congress Budget Office, 2008). The resulting infrastruc-
ture deterioration and vulnerability has been reported by the media and professional 
organizations (The Economist, 2011; American Society of Civil Engineers, ASCE, 
2009). However, in such reports, the critical role of interdependence as an essential 
contributor to vulnerability during abnormal operation is not highlighted; further-
more, the fact that network response and interdependence effects are inherently un-
certain receives limited attention, despite its impact in infrastructure operation and 
management and associated decision making. 
As networks have become larger and more complex, they have become more in-
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Figure 1.1 : Urban population growth (1.1(a)) as reported in 2010, and (1.1(b)) 
forecast for 2050. Larger urban population implies increased pressure on urban in-
frastructure and greater inoperability risk for cities exposed to strong perturbations 
like seismic events. Source: 2012. 
terconnected (Amin, 2000b ). This interconnection is a positive phenomenon during 
regular operation as it allows easy access to resources needed by other systems to 
operate as intended. However, the interdependence existence implies that the protec-
3 
tion of an urban network requires the additional protection of components in external 
systems (O'Rourke, 2007). In fact, the implication is that interdependence between 
systems is likely to increase the original vulnerability of single networks. 
The natural question in relation to the role of interdependence in systemic fragility 
is how much its impact is (Amin, 2000a). This thesis introduces a methodology to 
study that quantification problem while considering the randomness of network com-
ponent responses and interdependence effects triggered by seismic perturbation. The 
proposed methodology is implemented using a new Interdependent Fragility (IFA) 
algorithm, based on a proposed description of how earthquake-induced damage prop-
agates within each system and across networks. This propagation mechanism is used 
to estimate the reduction of the network capacities to fulfill their regular service de-
mands. Results from this IFA strategy can be used to forecast systemic damage in the 
event of earthquake, which in turn can be used to test mitigation actions, estimate 
required mitigation expenditures, and design emergency plans to be implemented 
by public actors (e.g. civil servants, agency managers) or private stakeholders (e.g. 
utility managers, insurers, businesses). 
The proposed IFA methodology targets earthquake events as the perturbation type 
acting on interdependent systems. Nevertheless, this methodology can be adapted 
to study other types of natural hazards by changing the input hazard and fragility 
information, but this thesis chooses to focus on seismic hazards due to the destructive 
capacity and geographical reach that earthquakes have shown in important cities 
around the world. The experiences of San Francisco, USA (1905), Tokyo, Japan 
(1923), or Mexico City, Mexico (1982), Maule, Chile (2010), Tohoku, Japan (2011) 
among many others confirm the level of damage that earthquakes can cause in densely 
populated urban centers. 
4 
Additionally, due to their widespread action and intensity, earthquakes are prone 
to produce scenarios in which interdependence becomes evident: emergency attention 
slows down when the transportation network is disrupted; the repair of utility sys-
tems is delayed, hospitals come under stress when power and water services are not 
available; businesses are further upset when telecommunications systems are down; 
water or natural gas pumps may stop working without power; and power itself may 
stop flowing if thermal power stations are left without natural gas to burn or water 
to cool down. These examples illustrate how perturbation-induced interdependence 
enables interaction between urban network fragilities, a condition that may lead to 
self-reinforcing cycles of damage feedback. 
1.2 Basic terminology 
Before introducing the details of the IFA algorithm, a basic set of definitions must 
be provided. This thesis is focused on the concept of fragility. Fragility measures the 
conditional probability, that is the likelihood, of a component or system reaching or 
exceeding a performance limit under the effect of an external perturbation of known 
intensity. Because of this definition, fragility depends on the magnitude and type of 
the selected perturbation (e.g., an earthquake inducing a peak ground acceleration of 
0.35g at a given location), and on the level of performance targeted as desirable by 
an analyst, an utility operator or a decision maker. This desired performance target 
is the performance limit state that establishes the threshold dividing the zones of 
operation at different levels of quality, and failure for a component or a network. 
In this thesis, the concept of fragility is applied to individual network compo-
nents and to complete urban networks. Indeed, the target of the present study is 
the description of systemic fragility, that is the fragility of full networks resulting 
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from the interaction between component fragilities, internal mechanisms of fragility 
propagation, and the external fragility spread among networks by the presence of 
interdependence. When the term interdependent systemic fragility is used, the inten-
tion is to point out system-level fragility that already includes the effects produced 
by interdependence. 
Another important term used in this thesis is perturbation. A perturbation is 
understood here as any type of phenomenon that may cause the failure of network 
components. Perturbations can be natural (e.g., earthquakes or hurricanes) or man-
made (e.g., accidents or terrorism). Earthquakes are perturbations that are specially 
strong and widespread but also uncertain, i.e., it is not clear when and how widespread 
their effect is going to be. Earthquakes as a perturbation are described using two 
approaches: a basic approach of seismic scenarios and a more complex approach of 
probabilistic seismic hazard. 
Seismic scenarios are expressed in the form of maps indicating the level of seismic 
intensity at the different locations of the components of an analyzed urban network. 
These maps are created using a simulation of a single earthquake whose source and 
magnitude has been specified. The propagation of the earthquake's released energy 
across the area where the affected network is localized is the source for the intensity 
values reported in the seismic scenario's intensity map (Jones et al., 2008) 
A more complex but also more informative approach for earthquake representa-
tion is probabilistic seismic hazard. Seismic hazard, as seismic scenarios, uses seismic 
intensity maps; however, a seismic hazard characterization generates a set of seismic 
intensity maps assigning a probability of occurrence to each of them. This charac-
terization is done in such a way that it is possible to estimate the expected annual 
probabilities of the network fragility by using the simulated seismic intensity maps 
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(Kiremidjian et al., 2007) allowing the convolution of hazard and vulnerability as 
required for risk assessment. 
1.3 Approaches to interdependence modeling 
This thesis uses mathematical graph representations of urban networks to simulate the 
effects of seismic perturbation of the system components. The proposed methodology 
tracks how this initial damage triggers additional internal failures due to disconnection 
of pristine components and flow overloading. These internal failures in turn cause 
additional failures in external networks due to the dependence of their components 
in the services provided by external systems. These three effects are combined to 
estimate the final status of the simulated networks. 
The previous process forms the core of a Monte Carlo simulation program in which 
interdependent networks are subjected to multiple instances of seismic action using a 
fixed set of seismic scenarios (called here a scenario sweep) or a probabilistic seismic 
hazard description that uses multiple sampled intensity maps along with their proba-
bility of occurrence. Statistical analysis of the performance degradation resulting from 
this simulation program produces estimates of the likelihood of the single simulated 
networks exceeding established performance loss targets. These statistics produce the 
sought systemic fragility values that include the contribution of interdependence. 
Previous studies on the effects of interdependence in urban networks use different 
approaches for the representation of interdependence and the description of systemic 
vulnerability. Indeed, the interest on the study of interdependence effects on the 
functionality of urban infrastructure has grown significantly from initial theoretical 
developments in Mathematics and Physics towards a more direct application in real 
engineering networks. 
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The work by Rinaldi et al. (2001) is a defining report on the topic of utility inter-
dependence in terms of a description of its effects and its classification for infrastruc-
ture networks. Their classification of interdependencies discussed four basic classes: 
physical, geographical, cyber, and logical. Physical interdependence occurs when an 
infrastructure directly depends on the output of another for its regular functional-
ity. Geographical interdependence takes place when infrastructure elements share a 
spacial location in such a way that disruption to the location itself may induce per-
turbation to all the elements in the same area. Cyber interdependence is a condition 
in which the normal functionality of an infrastructure depends on information pro-
vided by another system. Finally, logical interdependence describes interdependence 
conditions that do not match any of the three previous classes. Political and mar-
ket interactions with infrastructure networks, with human intervention as a defining 
factor, fall under the scope of this last classification label. 
Physical interdependence is considered and modeled by several authors in the 
field. Lee et al. (2007) model interdependence using physical interconnection links. 
These authors assign actual flow capacities and demand levels to all network links 
and solve the resulting supply and demand problem using optimization tools. Their 
model allows to measure the impact of perturbation in the infrastructure networks 
(attack or random failures) on the internal flow redistribution. In another approach, 
researchers like Duenas-Osorio et al. (2007) and Hernandez-Fajardo and Duenas-
Osorio (2011) model physical interdependence using intersystemic links that describe 
the likelihood of damage transmission between external components. Their approach 
includes a probabilistic parameter that makes it appealing for the estimation of phys-
ical interdependence effects on systemic fragility, as it involves not only the physical 
representation of interconnection but also a probability associated to its occurrence. 
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For the case of geographical interdependence, Johansson and Hassel (2010) ex-
plores its impact using a GIS-based description of infrastructure systems, quantifying 
the magnitude of expected damage caused by attacks or accidents affecting locations 
used simultaneously by infrastructure elements belonging to different networks. 
Cyber interdependence is a recent creation, a byproduct of the information revo-
lution produced by digital telecommunication and the Internet. A critical example of 
this type of interdependence is the interaction between SCADA (Supervisory Control 
And Data Acquisition) systems, telecommunication systems, and power networks. 
Much discussion on the literature has been directed to the likelihood of disruption 
of the United States power grid by a cyber attack by internal or external antago-
nists against SCADA systems (Ten et al., 2008). Public attention on the subject of 
SCADA-Power grid interdependence has increased due to the discovery of computa-
tional applications created to disrupt industrial facilities with potential consequences 
of national scale (Matrosov et al., 2011; Symantec Security Response, 2011). 
Finally, Rinaldi et al. (2001) discussed how the California energy crisis occurring 
from 1996 to 2003 (Healy and Palepu, 2003) showcased the logical interdependence 
existing between human-decision driven markets, the financial sector, and political 
decision-makers at the state and national levels. 
The discussion of the characteristics and differences of interdependent classes in 
Rinaldi et al. {2001) provides a basic foundation for the treatment of interdependence 
effects on urban infrastructure. At the same time, the work does not provide a mech-
anism or methodology for simulating interdependence effects either in operational 
conditions or during events or perturbation, although it discusses Complex Adaptive 
Systems (Holland, 2006) as the proper interpretation of the nature of infrastructure 
networks. The paper does emphasize the need for further studies and encourages 
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efforts toward the explicit accounting of interdependence on systemic studies. 
Different approaches could be considered as potential answers to the need to model 
interdependence on urban networks and its consequences. Four alternatives can be 
highlighted as key approaches due to the nature of their assumptions and the level of 
detail required for their systemic descriptions: input-output approaches, agent-based 
methods, empirical methods, and complex networks approaches. 
The input-output approach used by authors like Haimes and Jiang (2001) and 
Barker and Santos (2010) for the description of interdependence interaction between 
networks and their joint response to perturbation are based on the landmark work 
by Leontief (1986) for the input-output representation of the interaction of economic 
sectors. In this input-output approach for utility systems, each infrastructure sector is 
associated to a column and row in an input-output matrix whose entries describe the 
level of interaction and potential impact caused in a system by damage in another ex-
ternal to it. This input-output matrix is then incorporated in a linear representation 
of the future joint status of the networks including the action of external perturba-
tions. With this mathematical description and enough information to populate the 
input-output interdependence matrix and describe the intensity of perturbations, it 
is straightforward to evaluate the network inoperabilities resulting from direct pertur-
bation and propagated through the input-output matrix (Haimes and Jiang, 2001). 
This high-level representation provides a clear description of systemic interde-
pendence and its matrix expression allows the generation of fast estimations of the 
impact of perturbation of any given network on the total set of infrastructure sys-
tems represented. However, the method does not work with direct representations 
of the interaction between components within individual networks and does not in-
clude a description of internal damage propagation phenomena such as disconnection 
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and cascading failures, likely to occur in the event of strong perturbation. Also, as 
pointed out by the authors themselves (Haimes and Jiang, 2001), the implicit linear-
ity in the characterization of interdependence may not hold for real-life intersystemic 
interactions. The research in this thesis builds precisely in that limitation by propos-
ing intuitive urban network representations and goes beyond this basic feature by 
proposing its own probabilistic interdependence characterization and strategy for the 
calculation of interdependence effects. 
A second approach for network and interdependence description is the use of agent-
based simulation. Agent-based strategies use computational simulations for their 
description of the different elements of infrastructure as agents, i.e., entities whose 
behavior, interaction, and their emergent response to perturbation are controlled by 
predefined rules and goals (Zhang et al., 2005). By using this agent-representation, 
agent-based models describe infrastructure networks as Complex Adaptive Systems, 
that is systems whose elements called agents behave according to predefined behav-
ioral rules, interact, and eventually are able to produce emergent behaviors (Holland, 
2006). This approach to simulating systems combines a bottom-to-top network de-
scription with the capacity to specify individual agent behaviors that makes it ideal 
not only for the description of complex systems like economies and social interactions 
(Arthur, 1991; Bonabeau, 2002), but also for the interactions of such systems with 
urban infrastructures (Schoenwald et al., 2004; Ehlen and Scholand, 2005). 
The interaction of these components leads to an emerging response of the individ-
ual systems to which they belong and also of the system-of-systems described in the 
simulation. Agent-based methodologies are highly advanced strategies that require 
considerable computational power and important amounts of information for the de-
scription of the behavior of the different components. Their detailed description of 
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behavior and interaction between actors have contributed to the use of agent-based 
methodologies for the simulation of emergent response created by the interaction of 
agent-models representing people (Bonabeau, 2002), a target of particular interest in 
the field of Economics (Arthur, 1991). For the case of urban infrastructure, Pederson 
et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive review of agent-based applications developed 
for modeling infrastructure performance for operational and perturbation-impacted 
conditions. 
Agent-based methodologies for studying urban infrastructure provide a powerful 
tool to describe the functionality of networks, their interdependence, and their im-
pact of perturbation across scales from system components to societies. However, in 
relation to the work in this thesis, the problem of studying interdependent systemic 
fragility, which requires thousands of simulations, does make the use of an agent-type 
description of components impractical. An urban network component behavior in the 
context of this thesis is thus limited to the two possible states of failure or survival, 
while its interactions with other components are conditioned by its location, the net-
work's structure, and a potential role as a supplier to nodes in external networks. 
A consideration of the response of agents external to the functional performance of 
urban networks such as businesses, people, and political actors is likely to require the 
use of agent-based methodologies as part of the high-level problem of the estimation 
of society-level consequences of systemic perturbation. Such type of analysis holds 
much value and interest, but it is beyond the scope of the present work. 
A third approach to study interdependence between urban networks is the use of 
empirical data reporting the consequences of catastrophic events. Such data gathered 
from official sources, private agencies, or press reports is used to estimate the level 
of failure transmission between different infrastructure networks. Work by Chang 
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et al. (2007) and McDaniels et al. (2007), for example, have used this methodology 
to construct and analyze databases of impacts with the objective of identifying in-
terdependent effects. The analysis of such databases allows the researchers to arrive 
at a characterization of the nature, source, and magnitude of the different impacts 
across systems. Such information can then be used for the development of recommen-
dations based on the features of the interdependence scenarios identified and their 
consequences. The results from this methodology provide useful information due to 
their use of empirical results obtained from real catastrophic events. However, the 
method itself does not provide a predictive strategy beyond the general lessons learned 
obtained from previous catastrophic instances. In that regard, this methodology may 
provide a systematic way of analyzing damage information whose results and conclu-
sions can be used in validation efforts for the predictive methodologies discussed in 
this thesis. 
The final approach for analyzing interdependence effects on urban infrastructure 
performance is via complex networks analysis. This methodology is based on the 
representation of urban infrastructure using graph theory concepts, specifically the 
description of network interconnectivity using mathematical graphs, that is math-
ematical entities composed of nodes representing real-life facilities (e.g. pumping 
stations in a water network, electrical substations in power networks, etc) and links 
representing the connecting elements between facilities (e.g. cables between power 
transmission towers, pipes in water networks, etc). 
Originally used in mathematics and physics, simple directed graphs provide a 
straightforward, intuitive description of the role, localization, and interaction of com-
ponents in a network. In particular, the analysis of a network's internal interconnec-
tion structure, its topology, provides useful insights on the expected systemic response 
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(Callaway et al., 2000; Albert et al., 2000; Winkler et al., 2011). However, the key fea-
ture of this approach is the capacity of direct enhancement of the level of detail of the 
network description. Based on the basic topological representation, the complexity 
of the original model can be enriched by adding explicit roles to the network's nodes 
(e.g., supplier, consumer) or, in a key aspect for this thesis, the systemic fragility 
of a network can be studied by adding a well-defined description of component-level 
fragilities for perturbation intensities of interest. Furthermore, given its foundation 
in graph theory and network analysis, an important amount of mathematical tools 
and algorithms are available to determine network properties as diverse as the short-
est paths between critical network points (Dijkstra, 1959) or the maximum flow the 
network can carry (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956) under given conditions of supply and 
link capacities. The next section introduces the key concepts of this approach and 
describes how previous research and this thesis use it for the study of interdependent 
systemic fragility. 
Under the IFA algorithm described in this research, urban networks are described 
using the introduced complex networks approach. Using this approach, network inter-
dependence is represented using interdependent links, that is links connecting nodes 
in different networks. Such links create intersystemic connections between an external 
provider node and an internal consumer node. Furthermore, each of these interdepen-
dent links has an associated interdependence strength parameter (I str) that measures 
the conditional likelihood of failure propagation from the supply node to the consumer 
component in the event of failure of the external supply component. This interdepen-
dence representation is adapted from Duenas-Osorio et al. (2007), and it is intended 
to represent the likely failure of a dependent component when its external required 
providers are disrupted. Consider a pumping station being part of an urban water 
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distribution system. The pumps in this station depend on the power provided by 
an adjacent electrical substation which is part of the power distribution grid. If an 
earthquake occurs in this area and the substation goes offline because of internal 
physical damage while the pumping station suffers minimal damage, it is possible to 
end up with a scenario in which undamaged pumps cease to work because of lack of 
power. Note that in another possible scenario, the pumping station may have diesel 
generators. In this last eventuality, the water pumps will be able to continue working 
with no noticeable disruption for as long as the backup system is operational. 
The interdependence strength parameter measures precisely that level of depen-
dence between external nodes (also called master nodes) in terms of a probability of 
failure for the dependent node (also called slave node). For the pumps of the example, 
if no diesel generators were available in the aftermath of the earthquake (because they 
were never bought or were poorly maintained) then the I str for the interdependence 
link from the power node (the substation) to the water node (the pumping station) 
will be 1.0, representing certain disruption if the power node fails. In contrast, if the 
diesel generators were an integral part of the original design of the pumping station, 
and they were properly maintained, and even tested regularly, I str may be a small 
value or simply zero. 
This representation of interdependence is a key element in the simulation method-
ology introduced in this thesis. Previous authors have used this approach for their 
estimates of systemic fragility (Duefias-Osorio et al., 2007; Adachi and Ellingwood, 
2008; Song and Kang, 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Poljansek et al., 2012); however, the new 
IFA algorithm provides a framework for simulating the evolution of the interaction of 
network failures through interdependence links. This evolution of interaction is called 
here cycling stabilization and it is a differentiating feature from previous models that 
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only considered a single cycle of intersystemic failure propagation. That original rule 
enforced a policy in which additional interactions, that is potential feedback effects 
creating additional failures, were not allowed to emerge and hence their effects could 
not be reflected on the estimations of interdependent systemic fragility. As men-
tioned above, one of the key contributions of this thesis is the IFA methodology and 
its capacity to enable such cycling stabilization process. 
Other differences of the new IFA methodology with previous work include im-
proved algorithms for the detection of disconnected nodes, for the calculation of sys-
temic fragility, and for the procedure of internal stabilization and interdependent 
damage propagation. These differences are explained in detail in the inner chapters 
of this thesis, but their key contribution is their impact on reducing computational 
expense in the simulation procedure and modeling interdependence phenomena closer 
to reality. As an example of the gained efficiencies, the new computational implemen-
tations reduced the running time of a test case of 10 000 simulations from 15 days to 
approximately six hours with good approximations to results observed in real cases. 
It should be emphasized that the IFA algorithm works as the core of a Monte Carlo 
simulation program. This choice of using simulation has clear advantages over alter-
native approaches. One basic alternative approach is the use of analytical solutions 
to evaluate the expected network response. 
The work by Duenas-Osorio and Rojo (2011) proposes a closed-form solution to 
the problem of calculating the probability distribution of the reliability of a system 
with radial topology. Their approach is based in an efficient recursive approach, but 
because of its definition is limited to the the special case of radial topologies. 
Work by White and Newman (2001) and Li and He (2002) propose this type of 
approach where the internal connecting paths of a network are identified and the 
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probability of the system is examined through the failure probability of such paths. 
Such approaches provide valuable tools for the examination of urban network fragility, 
but they are essentially limited to small systems due to the computational complexity 
of finding the required disjoint paths (Wang and Silvester, 1993). Furthermore, some 
important dynamics occurring within a network (internal damage propagation caused 
by overloading, for example) are not trivial to express in this type of approaches but 
can be readily integrated in simulation-based approaches like the IFA algorithm. 
Another type of alternative approach uses a matrix-based representation of sys-
temic failure events to calculate systemic fragility (Song and Kang, 2009). The key 
idea of the method is that systemic events leading to failure can be represented in 
a matrix-form making the calculation of their probability of occurrence straightfor-
ward. This approach is extremely efficient if the analyst can successfully identify 
the mechanisms of component failures leading to the failure of the system. However, 
that requirement is equivalent to the problem of finding the internal paths used by 
the previous approach, and so this approach shares the same computational disad-
vantage of computational complexity with respect to the more general approach of 
Monte Carlo simulation used in the implementation of the proposed IFA algorithm. 
Despite the limitations of the close-form solutions, it is clear that if they are compu-
tational feasible they must always be preferred to simulation-based approaches due 
to their advantages in regard to insight and the calculation of importance measures 
of network components with respect to the estimated systemic fragilities. 
1.4 Research contributions and future work 
The core objective of the research recorded in this thesis is the creation of a method-
ology for the realistic estimation of systemic fragility for interdependent networks 
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subjected to earthquake perturbation. Previous approaches modeling interdepen-
dence and network response were either too high-level or too fine-grained in their 
description of network response to perturbation to be useful to probabilistically cap-
ture internal mechanisms of damage propagation. The methodology that provides the 
closest fit is the complex network approach, specifically in its use of mathematical 
graphs for the representation of network topologies as used in this research. 
The individual network representation is combined here with a model of inter-
dependence to form the basic description of interdependent urban networks. This 
representation is the basic working model that is enriched by the characterization 
of the network components behavior using fragility curves and network-level failure 
propagation principles. This fragility curves allow network components to exhibit a 
binary response of failure or survival to the action of perturbation. By the virtue of 
this behavior allocation, it is possible to measure the emergent systemic performance, 
an implicit function of the response of the different network components and of their 
dependence on external components. 
This enriched model is the target on which the proposed Interdependence Fragility 
Assessment (IFA) algorithm works. The IFA algorithm is the new strategy proposed 
in this thesis for the description of failure occurrence, internal propagation within 
an urban network, and external transmission through interdependent links towards 
interconnected systems depending on external services. Strategies based on similar 
models and procedures as the IFA algorithm have been proposed in the literature, but 
no known approach has included the key novelty of the IFA approach: the explicit 
representation of interdependence-induced feedback effects on network performance. 
This feature added to the simultaneous consideration of internal mechanisms of dam-
age propagation like disconnection and cascading failures make the IFA algorithm 
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a valuable addition to the existing body of literature in the field of interdependent 
systemic fragility of urban networks. 
Using the flexibility of the simulation approach, the proposed IFA algorithm was 
applied to a series of test cases to measure the effects of earthquake perturbation and 
internal propagation phenomena in the presence of interdependence. A first test case 
evaluated the impact of systemic fragility using a sweep of seven seismic scenarios of 
increasing intensity applied to two simplified versions of real interdependent power 
and water networks from a location in the US. The intensities of these seismic scenar-
ios were expressed using Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) for the facilities (nodes) 
and Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) for the connection elements of the water network. 
The seismic intensities were in the range from O.lg (where g stands for standard 
gravity) to 0.7g, while PGV values were calculated as functions of PGA. 
In this first case study, increasing the interdependence strength between the two 
urban networks led to higher systemic fragility for the water network while it had 
an almost negligible effect on the power system. Furthermore, the effects on the wa-
ter network were larger in an earthquake intensity range (0.2g to 0.5g) in which the 
intensities were large enough to foster disruption but not so excessive as to induce 
complete direct system collapse. These results illustrate that even though interdepen-
dence can cause mayhem in otherwise strong networks (like the test water system), 
its effects are conditional on the perturbation intensity (difficult to control) and on 
the fragilities of the interconnected networks (potentially controllable). This insight 
suggests that the best alternatives to control interdependence consist on achieving 
full decoupling of the networks or controlling the fragility sources in the individual 
networks that enable the external fragility propagation. 
A second study for the same test networks and seismic scenarios included the 
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effects of component overloading caused by the direct failure of components. Over-
loading failures can create a chain reaction of failures when a component overloads 
and goes offline, the load must be redistributed to other components who in turn 
may fail themselves. This chain reaction is called cascading failures in the literature 
(Motter and Lai, 2002; Crucitti et al., 2004; Wang and Rang, 2009) and an apparent 
way of controlling them consists on increasing the local capacity of susceptible com-
ponents. This mitigation technique called here local redundancy enhancement (LRE) 
was tested for interdependent urban networks using an approach that identifies the 
number of connecting paths passing through a component with the likely amount of 
load the element will take in the real network operation. These connecting paths 
change when elements are removed and such change is interpreted as the likely load 
change triggered by the perturbation. The capacity of the components is obtained 
from the number of connecting paths in the pristine network, and this original capac-
ity can be subsequently increased by applying a magnification factor (an a parameter) 
to represent the mitigation action of local redundancy enhancement. The application 
of the magnification factor to the original capacities defines the LRE strategy. The 
results of using local redundancy enhancement against cascading failures and interde-
pendence effects showed that indeed LRE can reduce cascading failures, and by proxy 
systemic fragility, but its effects are considerably constrained by the fragility of the 
components of each network and the strength of network interdependence. The test 
cases showed that the effectiveness of LRE for the weak and less-interdependence-
susceptible power network was small under small seismic intensities and nonexistent 
for large perturbations under which systemic collapse was unavoidable. 
For the strong, interdependence-susceptible water network, the LRE effect was 
large for small seismic intensities bringing down the expected systemic fragility as the 
20 
a factor increased; however, increasing the seismic intensity made interdependence 
effects stronger, inducing a noticeable reduction on the effectiveness of the LRE 
policy. These trends show that in the case of interdependent urban infrastructure 
the effectiveness of mitigation measures must be modeled carefully as the different 
factors involved may compromise the effectiveness of an otherwise sound strategy. 
In this particular case, the reasonable policy of increasing local capacity proved to 
be ineffective in a scenario in which the considerable fragility of the power network 
propagated to the stronger water network through their interdependence. 
The mixed results found for the application of the local redundancy enhance-
ment policy emphasized the need for testing alternative mitigation policies. A third 
case study targeted this issue and used the original interdependent power and water 
networks and a sweep of seismic scenarios to evaluate the effectiveness of two new 
mitigation policies at a proof-of-concept level: component fragility reduction ( C F R) 
and interdependence redundancy enhancement (IRE). The CF R policy reduces the 
fragility of selected components by an amount equal to 25% of their original values, 
while the IRE policy attaches an additional supply link to each of the dependent com-
ponents in all interdependent networks. The percentage of reduction for the CF R 
policy was selected as to reflect the expected maximum reduction of fragility achiev-
able under a reasonable mitigation measure before opting for a policy of complete 
replacement of the element under analysis. The impact of the mitigation policies 
was calculated as the average fragility reduction they achieved over all the seismic 
scenarios. The case study results showed that the C F R policy was more effective 
than the IRE policy when total reduction in the two networks was considered. This 
result is to be expected given that the reduction of component fragility leads to less 
internal failures and hence less interdependence effects. Note, however, that reducing 
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the fragility of a certain percent of network components (10% and 20% in the test 
case) by 25% will require higher investments than adding additional supply lines per 
component as in the case of the IRE policy. 
For the same case study, it was found that the combination of the mitigation poli-
cies, that is a mixed CFR+IRE policy using less CFR (10% retrofitted components 
only) and more of the IRE strategy, produced fragility reductions that matched or ex-
ceeded the performance of the single policies acting separately. This result highlights 
the need for a careful review of mitigation policies for interdependent networks; at 
the same time, this outcome shows that mitigation of the interdependence interface, 
the set of interdependent links between networks, can lead to efficient retrofitting 
investments to control interdependence effects. 
The previous developments on the effectiveness of mitigation measures show a 
promising avenue for further research on the topic of optimal retrofitting policies. 
However, the results were conditional on the seismic scenarios used to simulate 
earthquake perturbation. Therefore, the final contribution in this thesis combines 
a methodology for the generation of seismic hazard maps proposed by Jayaram and 
Baker (2010) with the IFA algorithm to obtain unconditional interdependent sys-
temic fragility assessments which account for the uncertainty of site specific seismic 
scenarios. The new hybrid methodology involves the key operation of generating 
seismic hazard maps using an importance sampling technique originally proposed by 
Kiremidjian et al. (2007) that reduces the computational expense of sampling seismic 
hazard maps. 
The new hybrid methodology is used to estimate annual probabilities of ex-
ceedance (APEX) of systemic fragility that are dependent only on the seismicity 
of the location of the interdependent networks. Its application to the test interdepen-
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dent power and water networks shows that the unconditional interdependence effects 
have a similar trend as the scenario-based systemic;: fragility estimates. Indeed, the 
APEX results for the power network showed small changes under different conditions 
of interdependence strength as before. Its expected systemic fragility rose only by 
14% when interdependence strength was increased from I str = 0 to I str = 1. The 
same interdependence increase induced a 229% rise in the expected systemic fragility 
for the interdependence-susceptible water network. 
Beyond the illustrative results in the case study, the value of the hybrid method-
ology rests on its use as a tool that includes a state-of-the-art strategy for probabilis-
tically simulating seismic hazard for the estimation of unconditional interdependence 
systemic fragility. This tool could therefore be used for analysis directed not only 
for seismic risk communication purposes, as in the case of seismic scenarios, but ulti-
mately to evaluate the current fragility of interdependent networks exposed to seismic 
hazard and to measure the impact of mitigation measures, like the CFR and IRE 
policies, on such fragilities. 
Some points for future exploration based on the developments in this research are: 
1) inclusion of a model of cascading failures using realistic flow analysis; 2) analysis 
of optimal mitigation strategies including realistic cost structures of mitigation and 
life-cycle costs; 3) estimation of interdependent systemic fragility for hazard sources 
different from earthquake perturbation such as hurricanes and flooding; and 4) ex-
ecution and comparison of fragility studies for theoretical models of interdependent 
urban networks. 
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1.5 Thesis organization 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows: Chapter 2, Key 
Concepts in Complex Networks, introduces basic definitions for the complex net-
works approach, disconnection evaluation, cascading failures, interdependence model, 
paradigms for interdependent damage propagation, and ranking strategies for critical 
network components. Chapter 3, Simulation of Damage Propagation and Interdepen-
dent Systemic Fragility, introduces the Interdependent Fragility Assessment (!FA) 
algorithm and explains its four basic operations of direct hazard action, internal 
damage propagation, external damage propagation, and systemic performance mea-
sure in the framework of a Monte Carlo simulation program for systemic fragility 
assessment. This chapter also includes two case studies measuring the effect of inter-
dependence strength on systemic performance and the influence of a local redundancy 
enhancement policy in the reduction of interdependent systemic fragility. Chapter 4, 
Mitigation Strategies for Interdependent Seismic Fragility Control on Urban Lifelines 
Systems introduces two conceptual mitigation measures, component fragility reduc-
tion ( C F R) and interdependence redundancy enhancement (IRE) targeting network 
component fragility and the density of the interdependent interface, respectively as 
prime enablers of interdependence systemic fragility. A case study of the two concep-
tual mitigation strategies shows that CF R is more effective than IRE, but that the 
synergistic combination is likely to produce better results with reduced mitigation 
intensity and cost. Chapter 5, Probabilistic Fragility of Interdependent Infrastructure 
Networks under Network-Consistent Seismic Hazard, extends the scope of the !FA al-
gorithm by combining it with an existent methodology that generates stochastically-
representative network-consistent seismic intensity maps. The seismic intensity maps 
are used as input to the !FA algorithm and the resulting fragility estimates are used 
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for the estimation of annual probabilities of exceedance for systemic performance 
that depend exclusively on the general seismicity of the network location, a type of 
result generated for the first time in this research. This thesis ends with Chapter 6 
discussing Conclusions and Future Research. 
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Chapter 2 
Key Concepts in Complex Networks 
2.1 Generalities 
The complex networks approach to study the systemic fragility of interdependent 
urban networks rests on the strategy that a graph representation of a network can 
be used to measure important properties of the represented real systems. Hence, the 
concept of a mathematical graph is critical. A graph G(V, E) is a discrete mathe-
matical entity formed by a set of nodes V (also called vertices) and the set of links E 
(also called edges), such that E E V2 , i.e., E is described by ordinated pairs of nodes 
in V (Diestel, 2005). The size of the set V, the number of nodes in the network, is 
called the order of the graph; the total number of links in the graph is called the size 
of the graph; while the number of links (incoming or outgoing) associated to a node 
is called the degree of the node. 
The topological information of a graph can be recorded using different strategies: 
adjacency matrices, adjacency lists, or incidence matrices, among others (Ahuja et al., 
1993). In all the results and computational implementations in this thesis, graph 
topology is described using adjacency matrices. These data structures are square 
matrices whose entries can only be zero or one according to the lack or existence, 
respectively, of a link joining the nodes associated to each entry. For the example 
network in Fig. 2.1(a), the nodes are labeled from 1 to 5 and each label is associated 
to the corresponding column and row of the same number in the adjacency matrix in 
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Fig. 2.1(b). In this figure, note how the existence of links joining node 1 and node 2, 
and node 1 and node 3 is represented with a one in the entries (1,2) and (1,3) of the 
matrix, respectively. It is important to note that adj acency matrices are symmetric 
only when the associated graph is an undirected one (i.e., a graph with undirected 
links) . The graphs used in this thesis for the representation of urban networks are 
simple directed graphs. Simple directed graphs do not have by default symmetric 
adjacency matrices because they are directed , and they do not allow loop links, that 
is links whose source and target nodes are the same. This last property guarantees 
that t he diagonal of the adjacency matrix for the represented networks will be filled 
with zeros only. 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
(a) Example network (b) Adj acency matrix 
Figure 2.1 : Basic example of a directed simple graph representation of a network. 
The presence of links between two nodes is represented by a value of one in the 
associated matrix entry. 
Another important definition in dealing with graphs is the concept of paths. A 
path is a non-empty graph formed by the collection of nodes and links required 
to connect the path's starting and terminal nodes. A basic operation in graphs is 
the identification of such connecting paths and different computational tools can be 
used for such purpose (Dijkstra's algorithm, for example) . The identification of such 
connecting paths has a critical role in the recognition of internal connection routes 
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and on the functionality of components in the aftermath of a perturbation. This last 
aspect is explored in more detail later in this section. In the meantime, the next 
section provides an overview of complex networks research for theoretical network 
models. Such recent developments have contributed enormously to the use of the 
complex networks approach for research in more applied fields as it is the case for 
this thesis. 
2.2 Theoretical network models 
Early studies on systems' topologies focused on the structure of ideal networks in 
mathematics and physics, as well as in social and natural sciences (Watts, 2003). 
The three major developments from such early studies in science and engineering were 
presented by Erdos and Renyi (1958), Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Barabasi and 
Albert (1999). The first model by Erdos and Renyi (1958) proposed the generation of 
random graphs, that is graphs in which the probability of existence of a link between 
any two nodes is the same for every considered pair of nodes. 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) proposed a second model for the generation of small-
world networks. Small-world networks display short average distances between nodes 
and important levels of nodal clustering, a behavior known to exist in some social 
and biological systems (Amaral et al., 2000; Watts, 2004). 
Finally, Barabasi and Albert (1999) proposed a third model, the Barabasi-Albert 
model, for the generation of scale-free networks. Scale-free networks display the 
presence of "hubs", which are nodes with a disproportionate amount of network con-
nections relative to the number observed for the average network node. This feature 
is indeed confirmed by the fact that these networks display node degree distributions 
P( k) following power laws (i.e. P(k) ,...., k-a, a > 0). This behavior of the degree of 
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nodes is displayed by networks such as the Internet and some transportation systems 
(Cohen et al., 2000, 2001). 
The three synthetic models, random graphs, small worlds, and scale-free networks, 
above are of interest as results based on their topological structures can be used as 
guidelines for expected systemic behavior in some engineering applications. However, 
the methodology and examples in this thesis apply only to real networks whose prop-
erties are likely to differ greatly from the standard cases described by these theoretical 
models. Furthermore, studies based on artificial models do not consider the inherent 
fragility of components or how such fragility propagates to the systemic level, both 
requirements for the fragility studies addressed in this thesis upon the presence of 
hazards. 
2.3 Error and attack tolerance studies 
An important aspect of failure in complex networks is the study of the error and 
attack tolerance of systems (Albert et al., 2000; Crucitti et al., 2004; Holme et al., 
2002). The term error tolerance stands for the estimation of the strength of a system 
to random failures of its components. Typically, error tolerance studies subject a 
graph model of a system to the random removal of its components. The number of 
components removed in each trial varies according to the purposes of the study, but 
the status of the system is usually updated after each removal event (Holme et al., 
2002). Attack tolerance studies aim to estimate the strength of a system subjected 
to a removal of its components (usually nodes) based on a specific measure of their 
importance for systemic functionality. Freeman (1979), Barrat et al. (2008), and 
Cadini et al. (2009) list the two most used metrics in attack tolerance studies: degree 
centrality and betweenness centrality. Note that in the context of network science, 
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the word centrality stands for relevance or importance for the internal connectivity 
of a networked system. Albert et al. (2000) used the degree centrality metric (i.e. 
importance based on node degree) to identify the critical nodes to be removed in 
their error and attack tolerance studies of artificial random and scale-free networks. 
Later, Albert et al. (2004) performed an attack tolerance study using a betweenness 
centrality approach on a graph model of the USA power network. The calculation 
of betweenness centrality assigns an importance value to each node (or link) in a 
system according to the number of communication paths passing through the node 
(or link) in question. In their work, the authors found that the power system could 
be disrupted by targeted attacks on its transmission hubs because of its scale-free-like 
structure. At the same time, the scale-free configuration of the network was identified 
as responsible for the robustness of the system to the action of random errors. These 
two trends are reconciled by considering that error failures remove elements at random 
and given the hub structure of scale-free networks, it will be more likely that such 
failures occur at nodes of lesser importance. Similarly, the selection associated to 
attack tolerance studies will mean that an antagonist will choose to perturb the hubs 
used by most of the connecting paths within the network in order to maximize the 
impact of her attack. 
Error and attack tolerance studies move closer towards the objective of studying 
urban network fragility, but they do not include component-level fragility or fragility 
propagation given their inherently deterministic nature. Nevertheless, the key value 
of error and attack tolerances studies rests on the introduction of external perturba-
tion and a first approximation to the use of the functionality of nodes as valuable 
information sources for perturbation design and performance estimation. This thesis 
builds on this approach for the purposes of systemic fragility. However, the strategy 
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followed in this work enriches previous models with two key features: the classifica-
tion of nodes based on their functionality and the assignment of fragilities to each of 
the components of the system. These enhancements take a simple graph model closer 
to the actual constitution of urban infrastructure systems. 
Before moving into the definitions of component and systemic fragility and system 
interdependence at the core of this work, an important internal damage mechanism 
is described in the next section: cascading failures. 
2.4 Cascading failures in urban networks 
Cascading failures is the term used to describe successive failures within a network 
associated to a condition of overloading of components rather than to their failure 
due to direct attack or damage on its physical structure (Motter and Lai, 2002). 
The experience of the Northeast Blackout of 2003 (Liscouski and Elliot, 2004) 
in the US and Canada showed how a series of small perturbations could trigger the 
collapse of disproportionally large service areas. This specific event was triggered by 
short circuits caused by tree contact with power lines in Walton Hills, Ohio. These 
perturbations along with computational and human errors spread until reaching the 
level of a systemic perturbation of the power network. Furthermore, the failure of 
the power network in the affected cities led to disruptions on the services provided by 
other infrastructure systems, i.e, additional interdependence effects like unavailability 
of telecommunication and water services were generated as a direct consequence of the 
cascading failures in the power system. Similar experiences have been reported to oc-
cur when strong perturbations like earthquakes have affected urban areas (Takewaki, 
2011). 
Fig. 2.2 presents a basic sketch of the mechanism of generation and propagation 
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of cascading failures in urban networks. In Fig. 2.2(a), the levels of the blue and red 
bars, standing for the capacity and demand at each of the networks nodes, guarantee 
operational stability. However, note that the levels of the bars at some nodes show 
a condition in which the spare capacity, considered when the current demand is 
discounted from the current supply, is not high. When node 2 is removed in Fig. 
2.2(b), the internal flow patterns of the network reorganize in order to adjust to the 
new operational situation. An unexpected consequence of such rearrangement is that 
the new amounts of flow passing through node 4 become larger than the capacity of 
the node. This imbalance forces the element to go offline and to trigger and additional 
internal flow redistribution that may lead in the best case to a new stable condition 
as shown in Fig. 2.2(c) or in the worst case to a new iteration of cascading failures 
with a potential to become a self-reinforcing catastrophic chain of internal failures. 
The previous illustration of cascading failures shows that a flow model is required 
for the simulation of the phenomenon. However, flow models require additional in-
formation sources and higher amounts of computational resources especially when 
further simulation actions are involved. Instead of using a full flow model, develop-
ments in the literature have used centrality metrics as indicators of the expected flow 
or load to pass through any given network node (Motter and Lai, 2002; Duenas-Osorio 
and Vemuru, 2009). One of the most common of such metrics is the already named 
betweenness centrality, btwn, originally proposed by Freeman (1977) for the study 
of the relative importance of individuals on social networks. Betweenness counts the 
number of paths connecting different node pairs in a network using a given node as 
an intermediate connective element. This path count is then normalized by the total 
number of connecting paths and the resulting quantity is assigned as the betweenness 
of the node in question. The expression for the calculation of betweenness is shown 
(a) Original condit ion: balance (b) Perturbed condition: removal 
of node 2 
(c) Resulting condi t ion after over-
loading of node 4 
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Figure 2.2 : Stages in the development of cascading failures with blue and red bar 
representing the levels of capacity and load in each of the components. Overloading 
caused by internal flow redistribution after component failures may lead to a sit uation 
of self-reinforcing failures in a service network 
in Eq. 2.1. 
btwn(k) = L Cfst( k) 
sf.kf.t cr st 
(2. 1) 
In t his equation Cfst(k) counts the number of shortest paths between nodes s and 
t passing through node k , and erst is equal to the total number of shortest paths 
between the same nodes. From this definition , it is apparent that the key challenge 
of calculating node betweenness is the identification of the connecting paths in a 
network. Such search task is a classical problem in the field of integer programming 
(Ahuj a et al. , 1993) and different algorithms have been developed for the purpose (See 
Bellman (1958) or Dijkstra (1959), for example). Furthermore, a recent algorithm 
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(Brandes, 2001) has been develop for the reduction of the computational expense of 
the betweenness calculation itself. 
A key feature of the original definition of betweenness is the fact that it does not 
impose any conditions on the nature of the sources and destinations of the connecting 
paths used for betweenness calculation. However, in some instances it may be more 
informative to limit such sources and destinations to selected node sets. For such 
instances, the standard algorithms must be adapted and the original betweenness 
denomination becomes an origin-destination betweenness, 0-D btwn. In this case, 
the original equation transforms into the expression in Eq. 2.2. with ISNI equal to 
the size of the network set of supply nodes s, and t limited to elements of the network 
consumption nodes in set CN. 
0-D btwn(k) = IS~I L a:(k) 
sESN st 
(2.2) 
tECN 
With betweenness values assigned to network nodes, a measure of flow (also called 
demand or more generally, load) has been obtained. However, the capacity of the 
nodes to transport such loads must be established as well. A common strategy used 
in the literature to address this requirement is the use of alpha-capacities (Motter 
and Lai, 2002; Duenas-Osorio and Vemuru, 2009). These capacities Ca(k) are defined 
based on the estimations of load obtained from betweenness as shown in Eq. 2.3. This 
strategy defines alpha-capacities as the product of the original proxy flow measured 
through betweenness times a magnifying factor (1 +a) used to control the level of 
spare capacity for each analyzed network element. The value of the magnifying factor 
is controlled by the a parameter that comes to be associated to the added capacity. 
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Ca(k) = (1 + a)O-D btwn(k) (2.3) 
This amplification strategy is adopted in one of the contributions presented in this 
thesis with the objective of modeling the impact of increasing local redundancy, or 
local capacity of components, on the control of the generation of cascading failures 
leading to increased systemic fragility. 
2.5 A model for interdependence between networks 
The previous discussion provided a description of cascading failures, a key phe-
nomenon of internal damage propagation, along with a model for the approximation 
of its effects in urban networks' performance. This section addresses the issue of 
intersystemic damage propagation caused by the presence of interdependence. The 
external damage propagation between interdependent networks is called in this thesis 
interdependence effects. 
A key result in the discussion of the effects of interdependence in networks was 
proposed by Buldyrev et al. (2010). These authors developed an study of cascading 
failures in interdependent theoretical networks subjected to random failures following 
an error tolerance approach similar to the one described in Section 2.3. Using concepts 
from network science and percolation theory, the authors measured the robustness 
of interdependent theoretical networks based on their ability to retain a surviving 
connected component of interdependent nodes after a series or random node removals. 
Their study concluded that the presence of interdependence made the interacting 
networks more fragile specially for the case of scale-free networks in which the original 
advantage of the presence of hubs for single networks became a liability as even nodes 
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with small degree could trigger a cascade of failures eventually spreading to the critical 
hub nodes. 
This theoretical result illustrates the importance of considering interdependence 
as an element of internal perturbation beyond the consequences of the individual 
fragility of single networks. The change in the paradigm of the robustness of scale-
free networks (strong to random failures; weak to targeted attack) was switched by 
the mere presence of interdependence, an unexpected factor that simply was not 
considered before as a critical element of infrastructure vulnerability analysis. 
In the face of this development, it is important to highlight some crucial limitations 
in their approach. First, it is clear that the conclusions in their report are based on 
artificial models that represent only extreme cases of the potential results observed 
in real networks. A second point is that their representation of interdependence is 
executed through the use of additional links connecting nodes in different networks 
without any restriction on the ability of the link to propagate damage. Finally, the 
work measures systemic performance using the survival of a connected component, 
i.e., a group of nodes that remains connected, a metric that could be replaced by 
more informative strategies measuring the effectiveness of service in the aftermath of 
a perturbation. 
These limitations of the theoretical model are addressed in the model used by this 
thesis for the description of systemic interdependence. Interdependence is described 
in this thesis based on the approach introduced by Duefi.as-Osorio et al. (2007). In 
this approach, interdependent links joining nodes in different networks are used for 
interdependence description as shown in Fig. 2.3. 
These interdependence links [Fig. 2.3(b)] are different from the internal links for 
each network in the sense that they represent feeding lines from suppliers in an ex-
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(a) Network and interdependence descript ion (b) Interdependence interface 
Figure 2. 3 : Sketches representing (2 .3( a)) urban networks and (2.3(b)) t he interde-
pendence model. A probability, I str , is associated to each of t he interdependence 
links to represent likelihood of damage transmission in the event of perturbation of 
t he supplier node source of each interdependent link. 8 1 and 8 2 represent two distinct 
interacting urban networks. 
ternal network to consumer nodes in the local network currently under consideration. 
Note t hat the supply provided in this way is more likely to be different from the 
one transported in the local network , but necessary for the normal operation of t he 
recipient node. This dependence relationship is clearly represented in the use of t he 
terminology of master node for the external supply link source (tail) of t he inter-
dependent link , and slave node for the t erminal (arrow) consumer node in t he local 
system. An essential feature of this interdependence representation is t he association 
of an interdependence strength parameter I str to each of t he interdependence links 
represent ing intersystemic dependence. This parameter is a conditional probability 
representing t he likelihood of perturbation transmission from the external supply 
node to the local consumer node in the event of failure or disconnection of the master 
supplier acting as the source of the interdependence link. This relationship is de-
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scribed in precise terms by Eq. 2.4, with F standing for the event of failure of a node, 
and slv and mst representing generic slave and master nodes in different networks, 
respectively. 
I str = P(FslviFmst). (2.4) 
The collection of interdependence links between two networks is called in this 
thesis the interdependence interface. The representation of the connectivity structure 
of this interface is done by using interdependence matrices I m. Such matrices are 
similar to adjacency matrices as the existence of links is made explicit by adding a 
one in the associated entry to a master and supply node ordered pair. However, the 
matrix itself is rectangular in contrast with the square nature of adjacency matrices. 
This rectangular property is due to the fact that interdependence matrices associate 
one given network for the columns and a different network for the rows of the matrix, 
with both networks potentially having a different number of nodes. A key point 
regarding interdependence matrices is that two of them are required to represent the 
interaction between two networks, one for each direction of potential action. Fig. 
2.4 illustrates this condition for a case of two small networks S1 and S2 , one with 
four and the other with five nodes and a total of three interdependent links in the 
interdependence interface between the two. 
The basic description of interdependence given thus far portrays the phenomenon 
of interconnection between networks as a rather negative interaction in which the 
intersystemic connection becomes a pathway for damage transmission. However, in-
terdependence can be interpreted in a more positive light when the possibility of 
having more than one external supplier comes into consideration. For some studies, 
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0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
Figure 2.4 : Illustration of the concept of interdependence matrices for a case of 
two small interdependent networks. Interdependence matrices are rectangular , unlike 
adjacency matrices, in order to describe the interaction between networks of different 
orders. 
in particular those related to the modification of the interdependence interface struc-
ture, an alternative paradigm for the interpretation of interdependence definition and 
its strength probability becomes useful. Under t his perspective, a new paradigm of 
failure avoidance replaces the original model of failure transmission (Fig. 2.5). 
The failure avoidance paradigm understands interdependent links as pathways to 
alternative suppliers of the external resource required by a local component for its 
normal operation. Note that this definition does not alter the fact that all alter-
native sources of a single external resource may interact as regular elements of an 
external network, and it does not constrain the possibility that a local node may 
require different types of flow from different networks. Note that the definition of 
the interdependence strength probability does not change, but the new interpretation 
shifts the association of the I str parameter from the interdependent links reaching a 
dependent node to the node itself [Fig. 2.5(b)]. In simpler terms , this shift means 
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(a) Failure transmission paradigm (b) Failure avoidance paradigm 
Figure 2.5 : Alternative interpretation paradigms for interdependence and interde-
pendent damage propagation in urban networks. The failure avoidance paradigm 
allows a direct identification of the I str parameter with the probability of failure of 
redundancy and backup systems at the dependent node 
that a node will be exposed to the possibility of interdependence-caused failure only 
when all of its alternatives suppliers of a required resource fail in an external network. 
This byproduct of the new paradigm implies an implicit reduction on the likelihood of 
interdependent damage propagation originally described uniquely by the magnitude 
of the interdependence strength parameter I str . This new interpretation allows a 
direct identification of the values of the I str parameter with the probability of failure 
of redundancy and backup intended to serve a dependent node in the event of failure 
of the main providers in external networks. A similar interpretation for the original 
paradigm was proposed by Kim et al. (2009) in their review of the developments 
proposed by Duenas-Osorio et al. (2007). 
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2.6 The concept of fragility and fragility of components 
The phenomena of cascading failures and interdependence-induced damage intro-
duced in the previous sections describe scenarios of damage propagation resulting 
from component interaction within and between networks, respectively. Such phe-
nomena are naturally conditional on the properties of an initial perturbation dis-
rupting the regular operation of stable networks. The concept of fragility attempts 
to explicitly consider such conditional nature and the expected response of network 
components subjected to perturbation. 
Fragility is defined here as the probability of a component or system under study 
to exceed a specified performance level under the action of a perturbation of known 
intensity. In mathematical terms, fragility can be defined using the expression in Eq. 
2.5. 
F(k) = P(S(k) ~ Solh = ho) (2.5) 
In this equation, F(k) is the fragility of the component k; S(k) is the status or 
performance of the component k when subjected to a perturbation h of intensity h0 ; 
and So is a performance level, target status, or maximum allowable damage state 
pre-established by the conditions of the analysis or operation of the component. 
The fragility of components is commonly specified in the literature using fragility 
curves (Mosleh and Apostolakis, 1986; Shinozuka et al., 2000; Ellingwood et al., 2004). 
These curves describe the change in the probabilities of exceedance for the studied 
component as a function of increasing values of a perturbation. Shinozuka et al. 
(2000) describe two approaches for the estimation of fragility functions for earthquake 
events - the perturbation of interest for the developments in this thesis. A first 
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approach for component fragility estimation is the use of failure reports obtained 
from earthquake events or from direct experimentation. A second approach is the 
use of numerical simulations, specifically subjecting computational models of the 
infrastructure element of interest to the action of artificial or recorded perturbations 
with the desired intensity characteristics. The use of either approach depends on 
the nature of the analysis and the availability of information and resources for the 
execution of the study. 
An additional source of generic fragility information for infrastructure networks is 
Hazus-MH (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003). Hazus-MH is a method-
ology for the estimation of potential losses from selected natural hazards (earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and floods) developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
FEMA. The technical manuals of Hazus-MH provide lognormal models for fragility 
curves of typical critical components of diverse infrastructure systems ranging from oil 
transportation systems to power networks. The models of fragility curves in Hazus-
MH consider four possible limit states of damage for the performance of components 
under perturbation: slight, moderate, extensive, and complete (Fig. 2.6). The con-
cept behind these states is that a stakeholder will choose one of such limits as the 
condition defining the failure of a studied component. In simpler terms, the selected 
state is such that the component is considered failed if its response under perturbation 
is beyond the specifications of the limit state's definition. This concept is of critical 
importance because the selection of a state defines the magnitude of the probabilities 
of exceedance for network components; values that in turn exert a critical influence on 
the magnitude and characteristics of system-level fragilities. Finally, it is important 
to understand that even though Hazus-MH concepts for fragility representation have 
been followed by different authors in the literature (Shinozuka et al., 2000; O'Rourke 
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and So , 2000; Nielson and DesRoches, 2007; P adgett and DesRoches, 2008), fragility 
curves from Hazus-MH must be used carefully as they are designed to be used at 
the national (US) level. Studies for specific cities may choose to generate their own 
fragility curves to better reflect local conditions of both vulnerability and hazard. In 
this thesis, the limit state used in the results in this thesis was extensive. This limit 
state represents a condition in which the component results with a level of physical 
damage that makes it unavailable and unable to restore it back to service or replace 
it in a short period of time. 
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Figure 2.6 : Examples of fragility curves from Hazus-MH. Fig. 2.6(a) illustrates 
the changes in lognormal fragility curves associated to different performance levels 
of generic components . Fig. 2.6(b) shows fragility curves for different infrastructure 
components for an extensive limit state. 
2. 7 Emergence of systemic fragility 
A basic target for the work presented in this thesis focuses on the characterization of 
the behavior of a network , its systemic fragility as a single entity, as it is influenced 
by external perturbation, internal weaknesses, and external interdependence effects. 
To address this point , a clear definition of the term systemic fragility must be given 
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first. Systemic fragility is the probability of a network as a whole exceeding a given 
undesirable, pre-established level of performance. This definition does not differ much 
from the definition for component fragility. However, the new definition has implicit 
a requirement not present for the case of components. While the response of node 
due to perturbation is specified as failure (0) or survival (1), network fragility is 
expressed as a continuous variable expressing the level of performance reduction after 
perturbation with respect to an initial systemic status. 
A node under perturbation fails if its response falls beyond the specification of its 
assigned limit state. If that is not the case, the component survives. The situation for 
a networks is different. Of course, it could be the case that a decision-maker is inter-
ested only on the total failure or the complete survival of the network. However, given 
that urban networks cover extensive areas serving considerable amounts of people, the 
likelihood of an event of zero failures or complete collapse if of little interest for public 
stakeholders and private shareholders. Instead, the regular approach consists on es-
timating the expected probabilities of specified levels of partial systemic degradation 
in the event of perturbation. In simpler terms, the target for systemic fragility is 
the characterization of the probability of increasing levels of systemic performance 
degradation conditional on a given perturbation intensity. 
Thus, this systemic fragility definition requires first the specification of. a metric to 
evaluate systemic performance in the aftermath of a perturbation with the purpose of 
assessing the systemic degradation used in the definition of systemic fragility. Once 
the metric has been defined, the additional challenges are limited to the calculation of 
the metric itself and the design of a strategy for obtaining its probability distribution. 
Measuring systemic performance requires the evaluation of the state of the net-
work before and after perturbation. The comparison of these two states, initial and 
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final, provides a measure of the inherent systemic strength. The status of a network 
can be measured in multiple ways, but the existing alternatives can be classified into 
two major groups: connectivity approaches and service-level approaches. Connectiv-
ity approaches for systemic performance focus on exploiting the change in topological 
properties of a network under perturbation as a proxy to measure systemic perfor-
mance degradation. Motter and Lai (2002), for example, use the size of the largest 
connected component left after perturbation as the metric of choice for measuring sys-
temic performance in their study of the strength of critical infrastructure networks 
such as the Internet and the US power grid. Albert et al. (2000) used the diameter, 
that is, the average distance of connecting paths between nodes in the system, as the 
performance metric for their study on scale-free networks. A similar metric, efficiency, 
is used by Crucitti et al. (2004) in their study of cascading failures in networks. In 
another approach, Albert et al. (2004) used the connectivity loss metric, counting the 
reduction on internal connecting paths, for the study of the vulnerability of the US 
power grid. 
The research highlighted above exemplifies the diversity of connectivity-based 
metrics in the literature. Their key advantage is the exploitation of topological in-
formation inherent in the graph representation, which results in efficient systemic 
performance evaluations. This advantage occurs as part of a trade-off against de-
tailed insight into systemic behavior. Although connectivity approaches do provide 
important insight on the nature of the response of urban systems, they cannot pro-
vide, by their own definition, detailed information on how service levels specific to 
service types (e.g., pressures, current, etc.) will be affected during a perturbation. 
This trade-off makes conclusions obtained from connectivity approaches of interest 
and utility only for initial screening phases of infrastructure fragility studies directed 
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towards investment decisions. 
In contrast to connectivity approaches, service-level approaches require, in addi-
tion to the topology of the system, information on service supply and demand levels, 
capacities, and transportation cost for different network components. All this new 
information is necessary to obtain a required approximation to a functional model of 
the system. In simpler terms, to measure perturbation effects on a network's service, 
it is necessary to be able to understand and predict the resulting flow status of a 
system after perturbation and that requires additional data sources. These function-
ality models can range from optimal flow models, such as the one implemented by 
Lee et al. (2007) in their study of service restoration for urban systems, to models 
involving the simulation of the physical properties and component behavior of utility 
systems as done by Nuti et al. (2007) and Mei et al. (2009). 
From the descriptions above, it is apparent that service-level approaches lead to 
deeper insight into systemic performance. However, such insight is obtained at the 
cost of additional information (not always available), and computational cost. The 
approach followed in this research seeks informative estimations that can be enriched 
and updated at a fast pace, a requirement that becomes critical if simulation is used 
for the description of the probabilistic nature of systemic fragility. In such cases, the 
demand for computational resources is an important factor for the selection of an 
appropriate systemic performance metric. 
For the test cases in this thesis, it was estimated that a connectivity approach 
was sufficient to illustrate the introduced methodologies. It is important, however, to 
highlight at this point that all the results in the test cases present trends that are likely 
to occur in real networks, but that detailed models of local conditions and more de-
tailed description of systemic performance should be used for decision-making in real 
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infrastructure networks. Indeed, regarding the trade-off between insight detail and 
computational requirement of connectivity and service approaches, Hines et al. (2010) 
established that topological, connectivity metrics are not likely to match the insights 
obtained from service-based models in the case of real urban networks subjected to er-
ror and attack tolerance tests. This caveat limits the usefulness of connectivity based 
approaches, but not of the methodologies for probabilistic interdependence studies as 
developed in this thesis which can be equally used with service-based performance 
metrics if provisions of appropriate computational resources and necessary input data 
are available and taken into account. 
The connectivity metric used in the case studies in this thesis is Connectivity Loss 
(CL), originally introduced by Albert et al. (2004). The definition of CL assumes that 
network nodes can be classified into three not mutually exclusive categories: supply 
nodes (SN, also called generation nodes), adding flow to the system; consumption 
nodes (CN, also called distribution nodes), extracting flow from the system; and 
transmission nodes (TN, also called transshipment nodes in the literature), acting as 
connection points between internal supply and consumption nodes. In the terms of 
the previous classification, Connectivity Loss is defined as the metric measuring the 
reduction on internal connection paths between supply and consumption nodes in a 
system after the action of a perturbation. Eq. 2.6 shows the mathematical expression 
of this definition. In this equation, ICNI is the total number of consumption nodes 
in a network; C Po is the original number of paths from the supply nodes to the 
consumer points; and CPJ is the final number of the same type of connecting paths 
surviving the action of perturbation. 
- 1 ICNI (CPJ) 
CL- 1 - ICNI t; GPo i. (2.6) 
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Fig. 2. 7 shows an example of the calculation of Connectivity Loss for a network 
under a simple perturbation. Fig. 2. 7( a) shows the original network highlighting the 
connection paths from three supply nodes on the left reaching the three consumption 
nodes on the right. The total of nine paths use t he three transmission nodes in the 
network as intermediate points. 
(a) Initial condition: CL = 0.0 (b) Disabled node: connection reduc-
tion 
(c) New condition: CL = 0.33 
Figure 2.7: Example of Connectivity Loss CL calculation for a network of nine nodes 
with three elements in each of the supply, transmission, and consumption node sets. 
2. 7( a) initial condition; 2. 7(b) perturbation; 2. 7( a) resulting systemic status. C L 
associates the reduction in internal connecting paths between supply and demand 
nodes induced by an external action with the fragility of the network itself to the 
perturbation. 
The previous C L expression allows the calculation of systemic performance degra-
dation for a single event of perturbation. The final step towards the estimation of 
systemic fragility is the estimation of the mean performance degradation. In the case 
of systemic fragility calculated using Connectivity Loss, the problem rests on the 
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identification of connection paths and the estimation of their probabilities of failure. 
Unfortunately, the problem of finding all such labeled paths in a network is known 
to be an NP-hard (Non-deterministic Polynomial-time hard) problem, that is it is 
likely (although not yet proved) that no polynomial-time algorithm exists to solve 
the problem. Regardless of this fact, algorithms like the ones proposed by Abraham 
(1979), White and Newman (2001), and Li and He (2002) can address the task for 
networks of reasonable size. An interesting related strategy is proposed by Song and 
Der Kiureghian (2003) and developed further in Kang et al. (2008), which uses a 
linear programming technique to calculate bounds of systemic reliability. This pro-
cedure is dependent on the inclusion of failure scenarios in the objective function of 
the linear program and hence it requires the same type of failure path description as 
in the previous approach. 
In this thesis the estimation of systemic fragility is executed using Monte Carlo 
simulation. The key advantage of using numerical simulation is its flexibility. As it 
will be shown in the next section, the simulation of interdependent network response 
to the action of seismic hazards requires the inclusion of different steps whose repre-
sentation in analytical terms is not straightforward or possible. Simulation allows the 
integration of the action of initial perturbation with the subsequent phenomena of 
cascading failures and interdependence damage propagation in a way that its robust 
and conceptually simple to implement and verify in practice. Authors in the literature 
like Duenas-Osorio et al. (2007), Ouyang and Duenas-Osorio (2011b), and Poljansek 
et al. (2012) have used this strategy with positive results. The steps involved on sim-
ulating damage evolution and measuring performance degradation required for the 
statistical estimation of systemic fragility are the topic of the next chapter, Mitigation 
Strategies for Interdependent Seismic Fragility Control on Urban Lifelines Systems, 
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and the first contribution of this thesis. 
2.8 Mitigation actions in urban networks 
Very few works have addressed the potential impact of modifying the structure of the 
interdependence interface between networks as a tool to decrease systemic fragility. 
Winkler et al. (2011) studied the properties of generated network interfaces using 
centrality measures and their propagation role in the event of random failures and 
hurricane hazards. These authors found that interdependence configurations built 
based on centrality metrics can offer enhanced response to the action of hazards of 
importance for specific types of urban networks. In particular, they found that a 
power-water interface built using an efficiency-based principle showed levels of effi-
ciency reduction, their performance measure, comparable to those observed in real 
networks under hurricane perturbation. 
In another approach, Ouyang and Duenas-Osorio (2011a) proposed an approach 
to design interdependence interfaces with the objective of reducing the likelihood of 
intersystemic cascading failures. These authors produced interface design strategies 
based on centrality and reliability approaches, testing the effectiveness and efficiency 
of such methods using a global annual cascade failure effect metric. An application of 
their techniques to a model of real interdependent power and gas networks subjected 
to random failures and hurricane hazard shows that reliability-based-designed inter-
faces perform better than models built based on Euclidean distances. This last result 
highlights the interaction between the role of interdependence as an enabler of cas-
cading failures and the location of component fragility between individual networks. 
These two approaches used general models to test the capacity of artificial inter-
connection interfaces on reducing the negative propagation effects interdependence 
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induces. This thesis proposes two conceptual alternative policies to mitigate interde-
pendent systemic fragility. A first alternative, called component fragility reduction 
( C F R), decreases the component vulnerability to earthquakes by a fixed percentage 
of their initial value. The aim of this strategy is to address the underlying cause of 
interdependence, that is the fragility of the components acting as external suppliers 
to consumer nodes in other networks. A second alternative is called interdepen-
dence redundancy enhancement (IRE). This policy is similar to the ones described 
in the literature as its aim is to modify the interdependence interface as a mecha-
nism to reduce the likelihood of fragility propagation between networks. However, 
IRE differs from previous approaches in its simplicity. This policy aims to reduce 
interdependence effects by adding alternative supply sources to dependent nodes in 
interdependent networks. 
A key requirement in the execution of the conceptual policies discussed in this 
thesis is the need to identify critical nodes in interdependent networks. Indeed, both 
alternative policies, CF Rand IRE, require the identification of the top most fragile 
or strong components. Under the complex networks approach such identification 
problem is associated to the importance of a node to the internal stability or efficiency 
of the network. 
The problem of network centrality has been studied by many authors in the lit-
erature (Freeman, 1977; Barrat et al., 2008; Newman, 2010) However, this section 
concentrates on the two selected strategies to rank the importance of nodes in a net-
work used in this thesis: 1. NodeRank and 2. Origin-destination (0-D) betweenness. 
NodeRank is a ranking strategy based on the PageRank algorithm developed by Page 
et al. (1999) and used by the websearch company Google. NodeRank builds upon 
the spectral formulation of PageRank and expands it to measure the importance of 
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network nodes based on the estimation of their degree of internal connectivity and 
their fragility against a considered hazard. The key principle to judge internal con-
nectivity is the number of links (or degree) of a node combined with the degree of the 
nodes to which the same node is connected, thus assessing regional importance. The 
basic expression for PageRank is described by Newman (2010) as: 
(2.7) 
In Eq. 2.7, CR is a vector assigning a ranking to each of then nodes of the given 
network. In the inputs, A is the network's adjacency matrix; Dis a diagonal matrix 
of the outdegrees of the network's nodes; a is a scalar required to be smaller than 
the reciprocal of the maximum eigenvalue of AD-1 ; I is the n x n identity matrix; 1 
is an x 1 vector of ones; and f3 is a column vector of the relative importance of each 
node. NodeRank adapts the original strategy of PageRank and divides the ranking 
calculation into two steps. The first step uses a vector of ones for the f3 factor in Eq. 
2.7 to estimate a degree-based ranking. In the second step, the obtained ranking is 
weighted by a vector of node fragilities according to the hazard under consideration. 
An additional modification used for the case of interdependent networks is the partial 
inclusion of interdependence links as part of the outdegree of master nodes. In order 
to balance the effect of these extra links their number was affected by an arbitrary 
0.25 factor before being added to the number of links in the diagonal of D. This factor 
was included aiming to reflect the presence of interdependence links in the estimates 
of the importance of a node for the interconnected networks. Note that this value 
is arbitrary and can be adjusted as desired by the analyst in order to increase the 
weights of interdependence links in the analysis of importance. 
52 
The second ranking strategy, origin-destination betweenness ( 0-D btwn), mea-
sures the importance of a node based on the number of shortest paths connecting 
supply (origin) and consumption (destination) nodes that pass through the node un-
der study. The results of the 0-D betweenness count are weighted by the fragility 
of each node in order to arrive to the final ranking values used for the design of 
mitigation measures. This metric is based on the standard definition of node be-
tweenness (Freeman, 1977), but the inclusion of the 0-D and node fragility factors 
force the strategy to focus on the analysis of the critical supply-demand paths that 
drive systemic fragility. 
2.9 Seismic hazard characterization for urban networks 
The objective of this work is to address a challenge: the generation of network-
consistent probabilistic seismic hazard scenarios to use for the estimation of interde-
pendent systemic performance for risk assessment. The fundamental issue in the here 
is the generation of simulation scenarios adequate to the study of systemic fragility 
of networks, that is network-consistent scenarios. In this context, a seismic scenario 
is considered consistent when it includes the natural correlation, due to distances 
and soil conditions, of hazard intensities at different network sites expected to occur 
during an earthquake event. 
In the topic of earthquake scenarios, Crowley and Bommer (2006) compared the 
effects of including hazard correlation by comparing loss estimates, total damage ra-
tios in a distributed portfolio of buildings in Thrkey, calculated using two competing 
approaches: an efficient PSHA-based approach (Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analy-
sis) and a more computationally demanding earthquake catalog simulation plan. The 
PSHA approach simply combines independent Annual Probabilities of EXceedance 
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(APEX) loss curves to generate the total loss curve of an spatially distributed port-
folio of buildings in Turkey. The earthquake catalog approach generates independent 
seismic intensity maps that display earthquake effects as they simultaneously occur 
during an event, satisfying the requirement of inherent hazard correlation at different 
network sites. Although the annual average loss for both approaches was very close 
for a test case, Crowley and Bommer (2006) found that the two loss curves were not 
the same. Indeed, the APEX values for the PSHA curve were larger than those of 
the earthquake exceedance curve for most of the average damage ratios in the x-axis 
of the two curves (Fig. 2.8). 
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Figure 2.8 : Annual probabilities of exceedance curves for a portfolio of buildings as 
calculated by Crowley and Bommer (2006) for two competing approaches (regular 
PSHA and network-consistent hazard maps). The average losses calculated for the 
each curve are similar, but their behavior at different mean damage ratios (x axis) 
changes as the damage ratio increases. 
The model for generating network-consistent seismic scenarios used in this work 
is adapted from Jayaram and Baker (2010). The original strategy uses the seismolog-
ical properties of a fault system and Importance Sampling to generate stochastically 
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representative network-consistent seismic scenarios. Their fundamental innovation is 
the inclusion of a correlation structure for ground motion estimates, a factor omitted 
by previous research. Also important, the Importance Sampling procedure, adapted 
from (Kiremidjian et al., 2007), noticeably reduces the computational demand of the 
process of map generation. 
The developments in Jayaram and Baker (2010) and Crowley and Bommer (2006) 
highlight the relevance of network-consistent seismic scenarios for the reliability of 
probabilistic estimates of network performance. The methodology in this paper adds 
to their insights by explicitly considering the systemic performance variability present 
in each of the single simulated hazard maps. The estimates developed for the case 
study in this paper use mean values of systemic performance for the calculation of the 
probabilities of exceedance instead of using the values of systemic performance ob-
tained from a single damage simulation. This enhancement means that the proposed 
methodology directly takes into account the variability of network performances on 
the final probabilistic estimates, a development that allows, for the first time, the 
calculation of unconditional performance assessment for interdependence urban net-
works. 
Chapter 3 
Simulation of Damage Propagation and 
Interdependent Systemic Fragility 
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The definitions and developments in the previous section provide the general foun-
dation for the first development in this thesis. In concise terms, the first research 
objective was to generate a methodology to describe the likely steps a network will 
withstand from the original inception of perturbation triggering component failures 
until a final stage of performance stabilization followed by complete collapse or re-
duced systemic functionality induced by the accumulated damage. The solution pro-
vided to this first task becomes instrumental to address a second challenge: the 
implementation of a practical simulation-based strategy for interdependent systemic 
fragility estimation. 
This section builds upon the basics of the mechanisms of failure of components 
under perturbation (component fragilities), internal damage propagation induced by 
triggering damage (cascading failures), and interdependence effects on systemic per-
formance (interdependence model for damage transmission). Such diverse mecha-
nisms are incorporated into an articulated procedure that concludes with the esti-
mation of systemic degradation, which, in the framework of a simulation program, 
relates to the calculation of systemic fragilities. An approach similar to the devel-
oped here but limited to individual networks can be found in Adachi and Elling-
wood (2009b). The main developments described in this chapter were published in 
Hernandez-Fajardo and Duenas-Osorio ( 2011). 
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3.1 Interdependent fragility assessment algorithm 
This thesis addresses the first part of the described challenge, the generation of a 
methodology to describe the likely steps a perturbed urban network undergoes until 
reaching stabilization, by introducing the Interdependence Fragility Assessment (IFA) 
algorithm. The IFA algorithm specifies four interacting general operations for the 
estimation of interdependent systemic fragility (Fig. 3.1). The four operations are 
named as follows: 1) Direct Hazard Action (DHA), 2) Internal Damage Propagation 
(ODP), 3) Interdependent Damage Propagation, and 4) Systemic Fragility Calculation 
(SFC). The assumptions and implications used at each of these stages are explained 
in the following sections. 
A differentiating aspect from this methodology is the inclusion of a cycling sta-
bilization process for the assessment of performance degradation after seismic per-
turbation. Previous simulation-based research on damage propagation in networks 
used an approach that allowed only a single level of interactions between perturbed 
networks. Instead, the approach introduced here accumulates damage while allowing 
different cycles of interaction between the perturbed networks. The key abstraction 
underpinning this approach is that networks reach individually a status of partial sta-
bility that may be disrupted by the action of propagated external perturbation. In 
simpler term, this condition implies that simulated networks do not simply undergo 
the internal damage propagation ( 0 D P) and external damage propagation (I D P) 
stages in a single decoupled step, but that they enter a process of joint stabiliza-
tion in which damage occurring at the ODP stage triggers failures in the next I DP 
stage, which in turn leads to additional failures that disrupt the partial stabilization 
achieved by the networks after undergoing the previous ODP phase. This cycling 
stabilization process concludes when no additional failure is induced during either of 
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the interacting stages, a condition that can be reached in the same way by complete 
collapse of all infrastructure systems involved or by a status of reduced functionality 
in any or all of the interdependent networks. 
Figure 3.1 : Representation of the interaction between the basic operations of the 
Interdependent Fragility Assessment (IFA) Algorithm. The organization of the rings 
denotes the serial nature and complexity increase of the simulation procedure. 
3.1.1 Direct Hazard Action (DH A) operation 
The Direct Hazard Action ( D H A) operation consists of the simulation of direct per-
turbation action on network components. Two precisions are required for this step, 
the first with regard to perturbation models and the second to the simulation of 
component damage. Regarding perturbation, this thesis focuses on the discussion of 
seismic fragility and seismic perturbation. Given the nature of the simulation strat-
egy (Fig. 3.1), the characterization of the perturbation determines the features of 
the remaining operations and ultimately of the resulting fragility estimates. In this 
research, two approaches for seismic perturbation description are implemented. In 
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the first place, seismic scenarios are used for the generation of fragility estimates 
conditional on the properties of such scenarios. A seismic scenario provides a collec-
tion of seismic intensities (ground or spectral parameters) that can be used directly in 
combination with the component fragilities for the simulation of systemic status. The 
advantage of using scenarios rests on the control of the nature of the perturbation 
which is exercised in the selection of the representative magnitudes of the perturba-
tion intensities used as input for the IFA procedure. The main limitation of using 
scenarios is that given their conditional nature, seismic-scenarios-based results can 
be used mostly for illustration purposes, especially for the communication of poten-
tial consequences to non-technical communities or as exploration tools before fully 
detailed, more complex, and closer-to-reality fragility assessments take place. 
The second approach to seismic perturbation is the use of seismic hazard in the 
form of probabilistic seismic hazard maps. This last term stands for seismic intensity 
maps whose probability of occurrence is known as the result of the analysis of the 
seismogenic sources that originate them. Fragility analysis executed using this ap-
proach are unconditional on perturbation magnitudes and thus can be directly used 
for seismic risk estimation and decision making purposes. The main constraint asso-
ciated to the use of seismic hazard maps is its considerable computational demands 
when used as input for a simulation program. 
In spite of this limitation, decision-making dependent on the study of the impact of 
seismic perturbation on systemic fragility must be carried out using the unconditional 
type of estimates created by this last approach. Regarding the description of seismic 
perturbation, the IFA algorithm is independent of the either choice as it will operate 
without discriminating the sources of perturbation. This statement implies that su-
perior layers of implementation routines must be developed to handle the differences 
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of the procedures using seismic scenarios or seismic hazard maps. In simpler words, 
the usage of the !FA algorithm under different approaches requires additional com-
putational routines to guarantee that proper inputs are feed to the procedure, while 
the !FA procedure itself, and the assumptions used for its development, remains valid 
for any of the two approaches used for seismic perturbation description. 
The second point of order for the Direct Hazard Action ( D H A) stage is the nature 
of the component failures to simulate. First, failure is understood as a binary process. 
A component either fails or survive, and partial response values are not considered 
as the selection of a performance limit defines a boundary for the expected behavior 
of the component. This point means that even though in reality a component may 
provide some service, if that level of service is inferior to that specified in the perfor-
mance limit, the component will be marked as failed, following the binary approach 
followed in this methodology. Note that this criterion is created by the use of fragility 
curves and must be clearly understood by analyst and decision makers. Second, both 
nodes and links can fail in a network under perturbation; however, in some cases it 
is possible to focus the failure simulation in components with the largest share of 
fragility. Shinozuka et al. (2007), for example, uses such strategy concentrating on 
the simulation of the fragility of nodes, such as power network facilities, with the 
objective of simplifying the study of the fragility of power networks. In some other 
cases, and depending on the nature of the network, such simplifications may impair 
the accurate characterization of systemic fragility. Note that any type of decision 
regarding the characterization of damage for the simulation will have an impact on 
the storage structures and computational demands of the simulation procedure. Such 
demands must be explicitly accounted by the analyst. 
Once a decision has been made on the type of seismic perturbation description to 
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use and the component failures to simulate, the Direct Hazard Action (DH A) oper-
ation can be executed (Fig. 3.2) . DH A works simultaneously for all networks and 
all components involved. For each network element , DH A t akes the seismic intensity 
associated to the provided seismic intensity map as input to establish the probabil-
ity of failure of components using component fragility functions and their assigned 
performance levels. For the results presented in the case studies in this t hesis , t he 
fragili ty functions were adapted from Hazus-MH (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2003) using an extensive limit st ate associated to considerable physical dam-
age of t he component that does not imply total collapse but forces t he element to be 
offline for at least more than one week after the perturbation 's occurrence. 
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Figure 3.2: The Direct Hazard Action (DH A) operation of the IFA algorithm uses the 
intensit ies of provided seismic maps as input to determine component probabili t ies of 
failure from fragility curves. Bernoulli trials determine the status of failure or survival 
for each of the network components. 
Once the probabilities of failure (pof) are obt ained from the fragility curves for 
each component , a Bernoulli random trial (Papoulis, 1991) for each of the networks 
components takes place . If the random number is larger than t he value of the com-
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ponent 's pof, the component is considered to have survived the effect of the assigned 
seismic intensity; if the opposite happens, the component's status is updated to fail-
ure. The outcome from the D H A operation is thus a binary vector of zeros and ones 
if only nodes' status are simulated or a binary data structure (a matrix of a cell) 
when both nodes and links' failures are considered. 
3.1.2 Internal Damage Operation (ODP) operation 
The vectors or status matrices from the D H A operation are used as an input to eval-
uate internal damage propagation within each of the independent nodes considered 
in an interdependence simulation. Two mechanisms are considered in this thesis: 
disconnection failures and cascading failures. 
Disconnection failures 
Disconnection failures occur when surviving network components from the previous 
stage (i.e. nodes that survived the simulated seismic action) are left isolated from the 
surviving portions of the system. The main concern regarding nodes in such condition 
is that they are not available to receive or pass load continuously to other components 
and hence are failed for all operational purposes. This failure is detected internally by 
the network if a flow model is executed. However, for graph-based representations, 
such failures must be detected by searching operations on the surviving network's 
topology. 
Fig. 3.3 shows the basic mechanism of disconnection failures. The key point of 
these figures is that actual node disconnection is not so much as disconnection from 
other surviving nodes but rather their disconnection from surviving supply sources. 
In simpler terms, a surviving node fails if in the resulting surviving network after 
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perturbation it is left isolated from all potential supply sources. If at least one path 
from the node under study to one of such sources survives , the node will not fail due 
to disconnection. Note that this disconnection rule is solely topological and does not 
consider the potential event that flow may not reach the element in question even 
if the connection path exists. This limitation of the detection strategy is eliminated 
trivially when flow models are considered . 
(a) Init ial failures (b) Disconnection failures 
Figure 3.3 : Occurrence of disconnection failures of surviving components induced by 
perturbation action. The perturbation in 3.3(a) has the effect of removing the only 
effective connectors of the three nodes marked in Fig. 3.3(b) leaving them isolated 
and hence offline. 
The detection rule for disconnection nodes in a graph model must resort to a 
search algorithm on the network topology. Several alternatives may be used for this 
purpose (e.g., Breadth-first search, Dijkstra's algorithm, Bellman-Ford algorithm). 
This thesis uses Dijkstra's algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959) for all searches in networks. 
Dijkstra's algorithm is used here mostly for its versatility, specifically as it is used 
in this research for identifying node disconnection, calculating Origin-Destination 
betweenness for nodes, as well as systemic Connectivity Loss. The fundamentals of 
the search executed by Dijkstra's algorithm can be found in any standard textbook 
on algorithms [e.g. Ahuj a et al. (1993)]. In general terms , the algorithm uses a 
label-based heuristic to find distances and predecessors in directed graphs with non-
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negative link weights, as it is the case for real urban networks whose link weights 
correspond to the length of the connecting elements between infrastructure facilities. 
At the beginning of the execution, the algorithm labels all nodes with oo as their 
distance label, with the exception of the user-defined source node which is marked 
with a zero distance label. The detection of a source for a cycle is done by finding the 
node with the minimum distance label, i.e., the node with the smallest cumulative 
distance from the source node. Naturally, at the beginning of the execution this 
source is the user-defined source node itself. 
The search progresses by traveling within the network using the links of the current 
source node as described in the adjacency matrix of the network under consideration. 
Note that the adjacency matrix entries (usually zeros and ones) can be easily replaced 
by the actual lengths of the links connecting each source with its neighboring nodes to 
make the algorithm use actual distances between facilities. Note that although for this 
case the link weights are distances, other plausible weights could be transportation 
costs or any other measure reflecting the difficulty of moving flow within the network 
under study. 
The key step in the search from a source is the update of the distance-labels of 
the terminal nodes, which originally equal to oo are updated to be equal to the sum 
of the distance label of the predecessor node reaching the target terminal node in 
the current updating cycle (current source) plus the distance of the connecting link. 
In this context, the expression updating cycle refers to the series of distance-label 
updating operations occurring before a new temporal source is identified. Of critical 
importance, this distance label update occurs only if the updated distance is smaller 
than or equal to the original label for the terminal node. Once all possible terminal 
nodes are explored and their distance labels are updated, a new source is identified 
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by finding the node with the minimum distance label. The node so detected becomes 
the new source and the label updating process starts anew. The described updating 
rule for distance labels is the local minimization heuristic at the core of the Dijkstra's 
algorithm and is an instance of the application of the Bellman's optimality principle 
which states that "an optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state 
and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy 
with regard to the state resulting from the first decision" (Bellman, 1957). 
Two issues of importance in the previous description are: 1) how to retrieve 
the connecting path itself from the original source to a node of interest and 2) the 
termination criterion for the label-updating process. First, the path retrieval can be 
executed after the process concludes using a predecessor list that specifies the last 
source node that updated the label of a terminal node. This list is initialized as a 
zero vector and is constantly updated during the search. Once the algorithm finishes, 
any given path, and if required the full shortest-path tree rooted at the source node, 
can be found using a backwards search using the entries of this predecessors vectors 
and stopping only when the root source node is reached. 
The second issue, the termination criterion for Dijkstra's algorithm, can be spec-
ified by the user, but in general terms and for the purposes of this thesis the label-
updating process concludes when all network nodes have been used as temporal 
distance-label updating source. In order to use this criterion, an auxiliary list of 
visited nodes is required. The connection of the criterion with the problem of node 
disconnection detection is that no source node will be able to update disconnected 
node labels and hence two events take place: a) the distance label of the disconnected 
node remains unchanged and equal to oo and b) due to its high distance label, the 
disconnected node will be visited last and its entry in the predecessor vector remains 
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unchanged and equal to zero. The first event, unchanged distance label equal to oo, 
in particular is unique for disconnected nodes (the predecessor entry for the original 
source is also zero in the second event) and is used in this research to detect nodes 
disconnected from surviving supply nodes. Naturally, the detection of full disconnec-
tion of a node as specified by the definition given above requires the shortest path 
tree for each of the surviving supply nodes. If the list formed by the distance labels 
of a node obtained using the surviving supply nodes as a source is filled only with 
oo, the node is concurrently isolated from all supply sources, what is equivalent to 
disconnection and an offiine status for the component. 
Cascading failures 
Disconnection failures represent the first level of damage propagation occurring inter-
nally in networked systems. It is also a simple mechanism that causes no additional 
physical damage but loss of functionality for the affected component. As introduced 
in Chapter 2, cascading failures are a more complex phenomenon involving the in-
teraction between the capacity and the load of components surviving the combined 
effects of initial seismic damage and disconnection failures. 
The main definitions for the simulation of cascading failures were introduced in 
Section 2.4. The key assumptions in the definition of cascades are the use of a 
proxy flow on the networks' graph representation and the use of an origin-destination 
betweenness centrality metric ( 0-D btwn) as reference for both the demanded load 
and the available capacity of each of the network nodes. Note that the origin nodes 
referred in the metric are the supply nodes of the network while the destination nodes 
are the consumption nodes of the same system. 
If the classical definition of betweenness is used, tools like the Brandes algorithm 
66 
(Brandes, 2001) could be used directly for its calculation. However, the use of 0-D 
btwn implies that a different procedure must be used, as the connecting paths to 
explored are limited to those connecting the supply and consumption nodes in the 
network under study. The betweenness centrality metric always requires finding con-
necting paths for its calculation. This thesis uses Dijkstra's algorithm for obtaining 
such paths. The operations and outputs of this algorithm have been described in the 
previous section and are used in the same way for the 0-D btwn calculation. The 
basic difference in the use of the outputs between the betweenness and disconnection 
evaluations is the need to retrieve the connecting paths' structure to use them in the 
post-processing operation counting the number of paths using a particular node as 
an internal traversing point. 
Running Dijkstra's algorithm using each network supply node as the root of the 
search generates a shortest path tree listing the nodes that need to be traversed from 
a given source to the destinations of interest (the network consumption nodes). As 
pointed out before, Dijkstra's algorithm returns a list of predecessors and a list of 
distance-labels. However, in a key difference, the distance labels were instrumental 
in disconnection evaluation but it is the list of predecessors which is essential for 
the calculation of betweenness. Using a backward search from one of the network 
destination nodes, the structure of the connecting path from destination to source 
(in that order) is retrieved. Note that the first check for a destination node is to 
review its distance label entry. If it is equal to oo the node is disconnected and 
the betweenness evaluation must pass to the next destination node. If the node is 
connected, the backwards search proceeds to retrieve the connecting path structure 
until the entry with the label of the source node is reached. At each step of this 
backwards search, an auxiliary vector updates the count of the number of times a 
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node has been used in a connection path. When all paths for all origin-destination 
couples have been examined, this auxiliary path-counting vector contains the final 
path-traversing amounts that are used for the calculation of the 0-D btwn values. 
Two types of 0-D btwn values are obtained in the IFA algorithm process. The 
first type is obtained using the pristine condition of each network in such a way that 
the 0-D btwn values so calculated are associated to the conditions of flow existent 
before the onset of perturbation. The second type of values is obtained at every it-
eration of the IFA process. These values aim to represent the changing flow patterns 
induced by the removal of components caused by damage simulation from previous 
IFA operations (DHA, ODP, and IDP). These betweenness values are calculated 
using a modified adjacency matrix reflecting the cumulative damage of the process, 
that is a copy of the original adjacency matrix whose entries have been changed to 
reflect the failure of network links and nodes under the cycling stabilization process. 
Damage caused by cascading failures is then simulated by comparing the load passing 
at every stabilization cycle through a node with its alpha-capacity which is calculated 
as the product of the alpha factor and the original betweenness values obtained from 
the pristine network condition. Eq. 3.1 brings back the original alpha-capacity cal-
culation expression from Chapter 2 (Eq. 2.3). 
Co:(k) = (1 + a)O-D btwn(k) (3.1) 
Alpha capacities are used for the purpose of testing the effectiveness of a type of 
mitigation action called local redundancy enhancement (LRE). The strategy inherent 
in the LRE policy is that enlarging the capacity of network nodes will allow them to 
cope with surges in demand caused by instability in other network areas. This policy 
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is implemented by using the a parameter in Eq. 3.1 as a tunable variable with values 
ranging between 0.25 and 1.5. It must be noted that a can be readily applied to 
network links; however, for the sake of simplicity, the LRE policy was applied only 
to nodes in the illustrative examples of this thesis. 
3.1.3 Interdependent damage propagation (I DP) operation 
The interdependent damage propagation (I D P) operation takes place after the two 
previous operations (DH A and ODP) have been executed and the simulated net-
works reach stable conditions. The previous statement requires the interaction of the 
two operations of internal damage propagation (disconnection and cascading failures) 
which means that they feed damage into each other until no further damage is created 
in a process identified here as cycling stabilization. This condition of no additional 
damage is equivalent to local stabilization at the level of independent networks. Nat-
urally, such stabilization can be reached by local absorption of failures under reduced 
functionality conditions or by total collapse of the simulated interacting networks. 
With internal stabilization achieved, the propagation of interdependent damage 
begins. First, and for each network, failed nodes are detected. According to the in-
terdependence paradigm used (the discussed failure transmission or failure avoidance 
paradigms), the next step includes an identification of failed nodes with outgoing in-
terdependent links (i.e. interdependent links using the failed node as a source in the 
case of the failure transmission paradigm) or the confirmation of the survival of at 
least one of the supply source nodes for a dependent node in an external network (for 
the failure avoidance paradigm). Clearly, the detection procedures require different 
implementation routines, but once they have been executed and it has been deter-
mined that a dependent node is exposed to interdependent damage, the simulation 
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that concludes the process is the same. Indeed, an exposed node under any of the two 
approaches is subjected to a Bernoulli random trial to determine its survival or failure 
due to interdependence effects. For this purpose, the random trial uses the associated 
I str parameter as the decision threshold dividing the failure and survival zones in 
the [0 1] interval. If the drawn pseudorandom number is smaller than the I str value, 
the dependent node is considered failed due to interdependence effects. If the drawn 
value is larger than I str, it is considered that the dependent node managed to survive 
the failure of its supplier node(s) in the external system under consideration. 
Implicit in the previous procedure is the fact that a node that is dependent on 
different systems must undergo this process of review of the status of its external 
suppliers and eventual status determination tests for each of its supplier networks. 
This fact implies that a node can fail due to the absence of at least one of the supply 
types it requires for its regular functionality as expected to happen in real urban 
infrastructure networks. 
The previous description relates to the simulation of interdependence failures; 
however, the simulation of the interaction between urban networks as entities brings 
additional challenges. The key concern on the description of network interdependence 
simulation is how networks interact and specifically how interdependent failures are 
communicated between networks. This thesis assumes an instantaneous communica-
tion and failure propagation across systems such that for a number of networks, ns, 
all of them simultaneously affect each other with no explicit hierarchy of interaction. 
This assumption facilitates the computational implementation discussed in this thesis 
because it assures that the state of a network will not be updated in the middle of a 
general cycle of interdependent failure propagation. Such partial update may occur 
when it is considered that some network pairs (or triads, quartets, or larger groups) 
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interchange information at a faster rate than others. Indeed, the consideration of 
different communication speeds opens the door to the need to examine different con-
figurations of failure propagation that are combinatorial in number, a possibility that 
increases the demand of computational resources. 
Note that the instantaneity assumption does not mean, as it may appear, that 
damage is instantly reflected in the status vectors of an affected network during a sta-
bilization cycle. Quite the opposite, the assumption enforces the use of an auxiliary 
structure for each network whose entries record interdependence-induced failures in-
dependently of which external system caused the event. When all networks have been 
examined at the end of an interdependent damage propagation cycle, that is when all 
interdependence effects have been tested and propagated, the contents of these aux-
iliary structures are combined with the status data structures of the previous cycle 
to arrive to the resulting damage contents to use in the following stabilization cycle 
if additional damage is detected. The strategy of recording interdependent damage 
data without attaching it to a particular master network source guarantees no partial 
updating in the status of a network and a focus on final network status, i.e., the 
final network status resulting at the conclusion of the cycling stabilization process, 
rather than on the causes of such status. This outcome represents a certain loss of 
information but it provides a trade-off and intuitive mechanism for the simulation of 
intersystemic interaction in the environment of interdependence-induced damage. In 
an exploratory work, the author compared interdependent fragility estimates gener-
ated using different mechanisms controlling the order of network interaction under 
interdependence damage for a test using three interdependent urban networks. The 
results obtained from such test showed only marginal differences between the esti-
mates generated under the different approaches. 
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Before moving to the last operation of the IFA algorithm, it is important to em-
phasize that the presence of interdependence acts as an internal perturbation agent 
triggered as a byproduct of the internal rearrangement that follows after a perturba-
tion. As discussed, interdependence effects are examined only after the collection of 
simulated systems as a whole has reached an stable condition. This partially stable 
condition can change because of the external interactions brought into picture by in-
terdependence. It is clear that if interdependence damage is produced, the process in 
IFA cannot finish. Instead, the new damage condition produced by interdependence 
will be used to replace the triggering effects originally associated to the simulation 
of seismic action in the D H A operation. This connection means that the process 
of stabilization is cyclical and that the cycling persists until all networks have been 
through the three damage-adding stages of IFA (and in particular the interacting 
ODP and I DP IFA stages) with no damage being added with respect to the pre-
vious stabilization cycle. Once this last event takes place it is considered that the 
whole macrostructure of interacting networks has arrived to a joint stable condition. 
It is at that point that the IFA algorithm can move to its final operation of systemic 
fragility assessment. 
3.1.4 Systemic Fragility Calculation (SFC) operation 
This stage consists of the computation of the degradation of performance experienced 
by the simulated networks after the effects of the three previous IFA operations: 
D H A, 0 D P, and I D P. The degradation of performance is measured here using the 
Connectivity Loss ( C L) metric, based on the connectivity approach for measuring 
performance. 
As for the cases of disconnection and cascading failures, the key concern in calcu-
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lating G L is the identification of connecting paths. However, unlike the betweenness 
calculation, the interest here rests on the survival of connections rather than in the 
actual retrieval of the path structure between supply and consumption nodes. In 
this sense, this task is similar to the disconnection test in the ODP operation, but 
its scope is limited to the original network consumption nodes as stated in the GL 
definition in Section 2. 7 recreated here in Eq. 3.2. 
1 ICNI (GP ) 
G L = 1 - IG Nl t; G P: i (3.2) 
Two factors must be considered when evaluating this expression. First, for each of 
the simulated networks, the G P 0 variable representing the original count of connecting 
paths for each of the network consumption nodes must be calculated using the pristine 
information in the unaltered adjacency matrix of the network. The path data so 
calculated does not change during the execution of the IFA algorithm and hence it 
can be computed before the algorithm starts. The second factor is that the G P f 
variable representing the final count of connecting paths for each of the network 
consumption nodes must be recalculated after the end of each IFA simulation, that 
is after the D H A, 0 D P, and I D P operations have been exhausted by the simulated 
networks. 
For a given consumption node, G P f can have three possible values: G P f = 0, if 
the node failed or was left disconnected from the remaining portions of the network; 
GP1 = GP0 if all its connecting paths survived; or a value 0 < GPt < GP0 , 
describing a condition of partial loss of connection from its original internal suppliers. 
The actual value of G P f is determined in each of the three cases above executing 
Dijkstra's algorithm with each of the surviving supply nodes as a root. Note that 
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if a supplier fails, no search run is required, but the lost of the connection paths is 
nevertheless recorded. 
In order to illustrate the calculation of GL consider an scenario in which the 
condition of GP f is the same for all the network consumption nodes. Under this 
assumption, the first outcome (GP1 = 0) produces a GL equal to one, expressing full 
loss of the original connectivity between internal consumer points and supply sources. 
If the second condition occurs, (GP f = GP0 ), the GP ratio is one and GL is equal to 
zero, an outcome stating that the path count and therefore the network functionality 
was not affected by the seismic perturbation. Finally, if the third outcome (0 < 
GPJ < GP0 ) is extended to all consumption nodes, the resulting GL value will be in 
the range between zero and one, closer to either extreme according to the reduction 
of connecting paths induced by the seismic perturbation. 
3.1.5 Sequential description of the Interdependent Fragility Assessment 
(IFA) algorithm 
The previous sections described the basic operations of the IFA algorithm while em-
phasizing the internal calculations required at every step. This section presents a 
sequential algorithm that compiles those in the form of the pseudocode in Algorithm 
3.1. 
Three aspects are worthy of highlight in this pseudocode. First, the triggering haz-
ard action (the DHA operation) is the shortest and simplest of the four operations, 
an outcome that reflects the fact that simulating seismic damage in the network com-
ponents does not demand much resources in comparison with the other operations. 
Note that although the DH A operation is computationally inexpensive, the routines 
required to simulate seismic hazard demand much information and require a series of 
Algorithm 3.1 Interdependent Fragility Algorithm (IFA) 
1: Load descriptions for all urban networks models 
2: for i = 1 ---+ number _of _networks do 
3: Simulate Direct Damage on components 
4: end for 
5: if at least a single component failed then 
6: while At least one new component failure occurred do 
7: for i = 1 ---+ number _of _networks do 
8: while Internal Damage Propagation occurs do 
9: Estimate disconnection failures 
10: end while 
11: Estimate cascading failures 
12: Update system's damage status 
13: end for 
14: for i = 1 ---+ number _of _networks do 
15: for each slave node in the network do 
16: if all its master nodes failed then 
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E> DHA operation 
E> lines 2-4 
E> 0 D P operation 
E> lines 7-13 
17: Simulate interdependent damage propagation E> IDP operation 
18: Accumulate external damage effects E> lines 14-22 
19: end if 
20: end for 
21: end for 
22: Propagate interdependent damage effects 
23: end while 
24: Calculate systemic performance 
25: else 
26: No systemic degradation. Systemic performance= 1.0. 
27: end if 
E> SFC operation 
E> line 24 
operations that increase their computational expense specially in the framework of 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
Second, the use of iterations is widespread (lines 2, 6, or 8, for example) in this 
implementation algorithm. This fact reflects the interactive nature of simulating 
processes of damage propagation and stabilization after perturbation. In this regard, 
note that the main body of instructions, including the second and third IFA operations 
( 0 D P and I D P), are part of a larger stabilization cycle starting at line 5 and ending 
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at line 23. 
Finally, it must be clear that these instructions (line 5 to line 23, the cycling 
stabilization process) represent the bulk of actions during one simulation with a fixed 
seismic scenario along with fixed values for the a parameter for cascading failures 
and I str probabilities for interdependence effects. This fact means that the IFA 
algorithm will be applied in successive simulated perturbation scenarios until the 
statistical analysis of the resulting C L list provides stable estimates of the mean and 
standard deviation of the resulting systemic fragilities. 
3.2 Case study 1: Systemic fragility of interdependent power 
and water networks under seismic scenarios 
This case study discusses numerical results of the application of the IFA algorithm 
for the estimation of the systemic fragility of simplified yet realistic models of power 
and water networks subjected to seismic scenarios and interdependence effects. The 
tasks in this case study cover three majors areas: description of seismic perturbation, 
network and interdependence properties, and numerical results. 
3.2.1 Seismic perturbation 
The seismic perturbation used in this test case is based on the seismology of Shelby 
county in Tennessee as analyzed by Duenas-Osorio et al. (2007). The Shelby county 
area has received attention in previous research (Shinozuka et al., 1998; Adachi and 
Ellingwood, 2009b) due to the hazard created by the New Madrid seismic zone [Fig. 
3.4(a)] and the vulnerability of a densely populated city, such as Memphis (Elnashai 
et al., 2009). 
This test case uses seven seismic scenarios labeled according to the maximum 
(a) New Madrid seismic zone. 
Gomberg and Schweig (2006) 
Source: 
Seismic Hazard: PGA 
• • . 33 • 
• D.31g 
0.29 g 
- 0.27 g 
.. , .. 
- 0.23g 
(b) Example of seismic map 
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Figure 3.4 : 3.4(a) New Madrid seismic zone and 3.4(a) example of seismic intensity 
scenario used for test case. 
observed Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) among the different network locations for 
the seismic scenario. These intensities are in the range from 0.1g to 0.7g considering 
intermediate scenarios every 0.1g. The object ive of this seismic sweep is to explore 
the change in interdependence effects with increasing intensities as it is shown in t he 
fragility results in the next sections. 
3.2.2 Test networks and interdep e ndence description 
The test power and water urban networks are simplified verswns of real networks 
serving Shelby county (Shinozuka et al. , 1998; Hwang et al. , 1998). The power network 
(51 label) contains 59 nodes and 73 links. The power nodes are classified into 12 kV 
substations, 23 kV subst ations, and gate st ations. The eight gate st ations (nodes 
wi th IDentification Numbers (IDNs) from 1 to 8 play t he role of supply nodes , SN; 
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while the 37 nodes corresponding to the 12 and 23 kV substations are consumption 
nodes, CN (IDNs from 9 to 45). The remaining 14 nodes (IDNs from 46 to 59) 
are the network's transmission points, TN. The water network (82 label) has 49 
nodes classified as large pumps, storage tanks, and delivery nodes. Large pumps and 
storage tanks are the supply nodes in the water network, while the delivery nodes 
are its consumption points. The water system has 15 supply nodes (nodes with IDNs 
from 1 to 15) and 34 consumption nodes (nodes with IDNs from 16 to 49). Figure 
3.5(a) provides a wire representation of the structure of the test networks and of the 
relative location of their components. 
The fragility of individual components for the power network is presented in Fig. 
3.5(b) (diamonds and squares in red color) as obtained from Hazus-MH. For this 
network, the fragility of supply nodes is modeled using the curve for high voltage 
substations, while the fragility of the consumption nodes is modeled using the low 
voltage substation curve. For the water system, the fragility of supply nodes is de-
scribed using the fragility functions in Fig. 3.5(b) obtained from Hazus-MH and the 
type of each supply nodes (either steel tanks or medium/large pumping plant in blue 
color). In this case study, the fragility of delivery nodes was considered indirectly 
as a function of the fragility of the supply nodes and the interconnection features 
of the water system. Note that the fragility of links was not considered for any of 
the two networks. This assumption has been applied in previous studies (Shinozuka 
et al., 2007) for the power network as a valid simplification alternative. However, in 
the case of water networks, the absence of the quantification of factors such as wave 
propagation, soil deformation, or liquefaction, which are known causes of failures 
during earthquake events (Idriss and Boulanger, 2008; Orense, 2011), may lead to an 
underestimation of water fragility and therefore of interdependent effects. This last 
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effect was found to be of importance in a test application of the IFA methodology 
proposed in this thesis to a real case of interdependent systemic response to a seismic 
event (Wu and Duenas-Osorio, 2012). 
Water Network S 2 
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Figure 3.5 : Fig. 3.5( a) shows a wire representation of the test power and water 
networks in Shelby County, TN US. Fig. 3.5(b) displays seismic fragility curves for 
nodes in both networks. These curves highlight the higher fragility of the critical 
power supply nodes over the fragility of the water network counterparts. 
3.2.3 Interdependence interface 
This test case studies the systemic fragilities of the test networks using a failure 
transmission paradigm of instantaneous interdependence effects propagation and in-
terdependence strengths (Istr) ranging from 0.1 to 1.0. While the values of Istr are 
allowed to change, the structure of the interdependence interface is the same for all 
case studies. This restriction is important because research on the subject (Ouyang 
and Duenas-Osorio , 2011a) has shown that changes in the topology of the interdepen-
dence interface can be used as a mechanism to control interdependence propagation, 
a policy also explored in this thesis in Chapter 4. 
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The interdependence matrices (Section 2.5) used to represent the interaction of the 
two test systems were obtained from Duenas-Osorio et al. (2007) and are displayed in 
Fig 3.6. The sketches in Fig 3.6 use black dots to represent the existence of links from 
a master node (labeled in the vertical axis) to a slave node (labeled in the horizontal 
axis) . 
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Figure 3.6 : 3.6(a) shows the interdependence matrices for the action 51 ~ 52 , 
while Fig. 3.6(b) shows the corresponding 52 ~ 51 action. Although the number of 
interdependence links is higher in 52 ~ 51 than for 51 ~ 52, their effect is limited 
by the fragility of the power network elements . 
The comparison of Fig. 3.6(a) with Fig. 3.6(b) shows that the number and 
locations of interdependence links is different for the two directions of interaction. The 
direction 51 ~ 52 has nine links acting from consumption nodes in the power network 
to water supply nodes, while the direction 52 ~ 51 has 45 links from consumption 
nodes in the water system acting on power supply and consumption nodes. This 
imbalance in the number of nodes seems to show that the water network has important 
influence of the performance of the power networks. However, it must be noted that 
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the totality of the potential influence of the power system over the water network is 
concentrated on the critical water supply nodes. This influence is considerable, but 
it is also noticeable that not all water supply nodes depend on the power network 
[Fig. 3.6(a)] and so even complete collapse of the power network cannot trigger the 
total collapse of the water network. For the case of the water-on-power influence, 
the distribution of interdependent links covers both supply and consumption power 
nodes and hence its impact on the power network could be considerable. The results 
in the following sections will show that the apparent interdependent influence of the 
water network on the power system is limited by the individual fragility of the power 
network components, which in turn causes considerable interdependent effects on the 
water network fragility. 
3.2.4 Test specifications and results 
The test power and water networks were subjected to seven seismic scenarios, starting 
at nominal seismic intensity 0.1g increasing at a constant step of 0.1g until reaching 
the maximum level of 0. 7g, and six levels of interdependence strength, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0. 7, 
0.9, and 1.0. The fragilities of the components and the interdependence interface were 
left unchanged for all tests. Systemic fragility was measured using Connectivity Loss, 
C L and all estimates were based in C L lists created after running 10 000 simulations 
for each of the designed scenarios, a number of simulations that proved enough to 
generate stable values of expectation and variance of the systemic fragility estimates. 
Two types of estimates were sought with these tests: evolution plots and fragility 
curves. Evolution plots show how the average CL changes during the stabilization 
cycles leading to the final reported CL values. These plots are useful to visualize the 
magnitude of the influence of interdependence and the trends of that influence as the 
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number of cycles increases. The fragility curves generated here are systemic fragility 
curves. They describe how the probability of networks exceeding a connectivity loss 
value (an allowable damage level or performance target) changes with increasing 
values of perturbation. Note that although in practice a decision-maker is likely 
to choose a preferred performance level (i.e. a single systemic fragility curve), the 
fragility curves in this test case are generated for several damage levels (0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9, and 1.0) aiming to provide a complete picture of the variations of network 
response. 
Fig. 3. 7 displays two sets of plots related to the interdependent effects on systemic 
fragility. The top set (Figures 3. 7a and b) shows how the presence of interdependence 
affects the mean connectivity loss for a condition of I str = 1.0 and different seismic 
scenarios. The first observation from these plots is that the inherent power system 
fragility (stabilization cycle 1) is consistently larger than the water networks' for all 
conditions of seismic perturbation. This outcome is consistent with the information 
on the individual fragility of components displayed in Fig. 3.5(b) that shows the 
fragility of power network components being higher than that of their water network 
counterparts. 
In terms of susceptibility to interdependence (stabilization cycle 2), the trend 
reverses. The power network results (Fig. 3. 7a) show a minimal influence of full 
interdependence (I str = 1. 0) on the expected C L for all seismic scenarios. The re-
sult for the water system shows a strong individual performance (cycle 1) that shows 
important degradation for all the seismic scenarios considered solely under the direct 
action of the test seismic perturbation. The bottom plots in Fig. 3. 7 (Figures (c) and 
(d)) quantify the interdependence effect on systemic fragility. For the power network, 
interdependence effects contribute less than 5% of the total systemic fragility, while 
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for the water network such an effect can be as large as 500% of the initial fragility. 
These results confirm the interaction between component fragility and interdepen-
dence strength as a decisive factor defining the magnitude of interdependence effects. 
For this test case, the inherent fragility of the power network components proved 
decisive to curtail the potential influence of the water network on the power system 
performance. The power network fragility was so high that the system reached a 
status of complete failure before any interdependence effects could influence the per-
formance. At the same time, that level of fragility impaired the fragility of the water 
network making the contributions of interdependence many times (as high as five 
times) larger than the original fragility of the water network. 
The bottom plots reveal an additional critical factor for the description of in-
terdependence effects. A close examination of both plots [Figures 3.7 (c) and (d))] 
shows that interdependence effects are larger in certain PGA ranges. For the power 
network, the range is limited mostly to the O.lg seismic scenario. This limited range 
is explained by the fragility of the power network components. In contrast, the inter-
dependence contribution is more diverse in the case of the inherently stronger water 
network. Interdependence effects become larger than 100% for high interdependence 
strengths under seismic scenarios in the range [0.2g 0.5g] reaching maximum values 
for the 0.3g seismic scenario. Thus, the interdependence contributions to water net-
work fragility were limited to a specific band of PGA levels. The lessons from this 
plots are direct: interdependence can worsen systemic fragility substantially, its effect 
is manifested early in the stabilization process, and its action is dependent on the in-
tensity of the perturbation and in the inherent fragility properties of the interacting 
networks. 
The second set of results obtained from this case study is displayed in Fig. 3.8. 
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Figure 3. 7 : Interdependent effects on systemic fragility for t est power and wa ter 
urban networks. Top figures (a and b) show average change in systemic response as 
a function of st abilization cycles. Bottom figures ( c and d) quantify t he increase in 
systemic performance induced by interdependent effect s . Dependence of the water 
system on the power network triggers considerable fragility increases. 
This figure presents fragility curves for the power (Figures 3.8a and b) and water 
networks (Figures 3.8c and d) for two interdependence strengths I str = 0.1 (Figures 
3.8a and c) and I str = 1.0 (Figures 3.8b and d). The comparison of the set of top 
fragility curves confirms the already described condition of minimal interdependence 
suscept ibility for the power system. The plots show minimal change in their shape 
and posit ion with respect to the level of PGA intensity in the horizontal axis. 
In t he same way, t he bottom curves showing the change in performance for the 
water network confirm the condition of dependence of this system on the fragili ty 
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Figure 3.8 : Fragility curves for power (a and b) and water ( c and d) test networks 
under interdependence strengths I str = 0.1 (a and c) and I str = 1.0 (b and d). The 
fragili ty curves confirm trends of minimal interdependence influence on t he power 
network fragility and consistent impact of propagated fragility on the water network 's 
expected performance. 
propagated from t he power network. Curves in Fig. 3.8d display a noticeable shift 
towards t he left, or zones of smaller PGA intensity. This behavior means t hat smaller 
levels of PGA intensit ies are needed to t rigger the same connectivity levels observed in 
t he curves in Fig. 3.8c. Also noticeable is t he change in the slopes in some of t he plots . 
This change indicates that under the new interdependence condit ion (I str = 1. 0), t he 
water network has become prone to substantial increases of systemic fragility wi th 
small increments of the intensity of seismic scenarios. 
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3.3 Case study 2: Impact of cascading failures and local re-
dundancy enhancement policies in interdependent sys-
temic fragility 
This second case study extends the scope of the previous one by including an approx-
imation of the effects of cascading failures in the two interdependent power and water 
urban networks used as test bed in this research. 
As in the previous case, the two test networks are subjected to a sweep of seis-
mic scenarios of increasing intensities under different interdependence strengths, I str. 
Additionally, this case study includes a model of cascading failures based on the prin-
ciples discussed in Section 2.4, specifically through the use of the origin-destination 
betweenness centrality ( 0-D btwn) as a proxy for flow amounts in nodes before and 
after the occurrence of perturbation. 
A key point in this case study is the use of a-capacities, and associated proxy flow 
capacities using the (1 +a) factor, which is at the core of the mitigation policy called 
local redundancy enhancement, LRE. This policy increases the magnitude of the 
initial capacity of each of the network nodes in an attempt to limit the overloading 
likelihood driving the generation and subsequent propagation of cascading failures 
as explained in the definitions section of this thesis (Chapter 2). The next section 
discusses in detail the specifications used for the definition of the scenarios in this 
second case study. 
3.3.1 Systemic Fragility Summary Plots, SFSPs 
The study scenarios are generated using seismic scenarios of PGA intensities ranging 
from O.lg to 0.7g, with a O.lg increasing step experienced simultaneously by both 
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networks. The input parameter I str takes values of 0, 0.3, 0.5, 0. 7, and 1.0 , while six 
a-capacit ies are considered by making a take the values of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0 , 1.25 
and 1.5. This selection of local capacities and interdependence strengths guarantees a 
considerable exploratory range of local redundancies and interdependence scenarios. 
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Figure 3.9 : Systemic Fragility Summary plots for PGAs 0.2g and 0.5g. These plots 
display expected values (E[CL], solid lines) and standard deviations (O"[CL], dotted 
lines) of Connectivity Loss , CL for the test systems (power, 51 , and water, 52 ) and 
different levels of a (Local Redundancy) at Istr values. 
Figure 3.9 contains Systemic Fragility Summary Plots , SFSPs for PGA values of 
0.2g in the first column, and 0.5g in the second. The comparison of the condition of 
the power network in Figures 3.9a and b produces a first set of insights. 
Figure 3.9(a) shows that increasing interdependence strength worsens E[CL], the 
expected value of the Connectivity Loss metric, for all enhanced local capacity levels 
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a. At the same time, the figure reveals that adding local redundancy by increasing a 
reduces E[CL]. Nevertheless, the short vertical separation between curves confirms 
the limited effect of interdependence on the power system. Increasing I str from 0 
to 1 for a = 0.5 [leftmost box in Fig. 3.9(a)] increases E[CL] from 0.79 to 0.89, a 
12% E[CL] increase. For a = 1.5, E[CL] changes from 0.64 at Istr = 0.0 to 0.76 
at Istr = 1.0 (rightmost box), for a 18.7% change. The fact that the changes are 
measurable, even for higher a values, tells that interdependence is still a factor to 
reckon with. 
In a contrast that highlights the relevance of the perturbation intensity, Fig. 3.9(b) 
shows that the power system fails surely under PGA = 0.5g. This scenario occurs 
due to the large earthquake fragilities of power components. 
For the water system, Fig. 3.9(c) displays trends of increased E[CL] with high 
Istr values and reduced E[CL] with high a values, as it was the case for the power 
system; however, it is noticeable that the effects of enhanced local capacity are more 
pronounced for the water network in the event of interdependence action [change in 
E[CL] from 0.74 for a= 0.5 to 0.45 for a= 1.5, under Istr = 1.0, top boxes in Fig. 
3.9(c)] than in the case of complete independence (0.04 CL for a = 0.5 to 0.02 CL 
for a= 1.5, under Istr = 0.0, bottom boxes in the same figure). This behavior can 
be explained by the fact that the water system is in itself strong enough to absorb 
the damage induced by the small perturbation created by the PGA of 0.2g, leaving 
the enhanced capacity unused. 
Finally, Fig. 3.9(d) describes the water system's response for PGA = 0.5g. This 
figure reveals two key insights. First, the high perturbation level decreases the fragility 
control effectiveness of adding local capacity. This is illustrated by the small change 
in CL under I str = 1.0 between a = 0.5 and a = 1.5 levels (0.94 to 0.87 CL; top 
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boxes in Fig. 3.9(d)), a 7.4% change, much smaller than the 39.2% observed for the 
same conditions in Fig. 3.9(c). Second, the larger perturbation intensity shows the 
local redundancy enhancement potential to control systemic damage in the absence 
of interdependence effects. The behavior of the I str = 0.0 curve exemplifies this 
effect; E[CL] drops from 0.62 at a = 0.5 to 0.46 at a = 1.5, (bottom boxes in Fig. 
3.9(d)) a decrease of 0.16, eight times larger than the 0.02 change experienced under 
PGA = 0.2g. 
Note that the behavior of the standard deviations of CL changes according to the 
system's condition and the influence of interdependence and local redundancy. In Fig. 
3.9(b), o-[CL] is zero for all a levels as the power system surely collapses under the 
PGA = 0.5; while in Figure 3.9(a), the O" curves show similar behavior for different 
I str values, as the systemic behavior is not controlled by interdependence but rather 
by the inherent power system fragility. It is also clear that o-[CL] is consistently 
smaller for the power system relative to the water system, a confirmation of the 
low variability in the fragility estimates caused by the high fragility of the power 
components. 
Finally, note that although the water system's potential to induce damage back 
into the power system exists, recent studies on post-event situations suggest that such 
levels of interdependence action are unlikely to be observed during real earthquake 
events (Duenas-Osorio and Kwasinki, 2010). This potential reduction on the power-
on-water interdependence impact occurs as a consequence of soil liquefaction and wave 
propagation factors which increase the fragility of the water network, and reduce the 
role of interdependence effects. 
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3.4 Validation 
The proposed IFA methodology, the mechanisms of internal damage propagation, and 
the model of interdependent damage transmission used in this research attempt to 
represent the expected behavior that real urban networks will exhibit in the event 
of earthquake perturbation. However, it is clear that uncertainty is present at all 
levels of failure propagation generation and that the fragility estimates generated us-
ing the proposed methodology ultimately represent an underlying random variable 
whose variability depends on the variability of the seismic hazard, the network com-
ponents fragilities, and the interdependence strengths of the network interconnections 
all factors that require important amounts of information for their proper assessment. 
Despite these constraints, the utility of these types of IFA models ultimately 
depends on their capacity to predict at an acceptable level the real outcomes using 
the methodology in question. From this point of view, the best way of validating 
the IFA algorithm is to benchmark the quality of fragility forecast estimated from 
its application to real scenarios. This statement means that the properties of real 
urban networks subjected to earthquake perturbation of known characteristics must 
be gathered and analyzed in a post-earthquake effort to verify the level of agreement 
between theoretical values from a computational model of the affected networks and 
the real observed levels of systemic disconnection or :flow disruption measured by the 
public authorities and private agencies in a catastrophe zone. 
Using such approach, Wu and Duenas-Osorio (2012) found a matching higher 
than 90% between the disruption levels observed in the 2010 Chile earthquake and 
theoretical estimates obtained using the IFA methodology. Noticeably, their study 
of the interaction between the power and water networks in the Chilean city of Con-
cepcion, indicated that the fragility of the water links played an important role in 
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the global systemic response. The matching between the IFA estimates and the real 
outcomes observed from the event improved when this factor was included as an ad-
ditional fragility source in the IFA simulation-based model. This experience supports 
the validity of the principles used- for the generation of the IFA methodology; how-
ever, more tests are required to arrive to complete assurance of the reliability of the 
methodology. In an additional note, Poljansek et al. (2012) used the approach fol-
lowed in this thesis for interdependence representation in their study of the fragility 
of interdependent power and gas networks in Europe. 
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Chapter 4 
Mitigation Strategies for Interdependent Seismic 
Fragility Control on Urban Lifelines Systems 
The previous case study (Case Study 2) introduced a first measure (LRE) to control 
interdependence systemic fragility as a byproduct of the attempt to control the prop-
agation of internal cascading failures in urban networks. This section introduces two 
additional mitigation measures acting on two key sources of interdependent fragility: 
component fragility and interdependence interface. The objective of the this portion 
of the thesis is to propose two conceptual damage mitigation strategies and evaluate 
their potential effectiveness in reducing interdependence fragility. The key problem 
of obtaining optimal mitigation policies with implementation details and cost-benefit 
ratios is beyond the scope of this work and is left as a critical challenge for future 
developments. 
The two conceptual mitigation measures introduced in this section require the 
selection of critical network components whose properties or external connections are 
adjusted to enhance the strength of interdependent urban networks against the ac-
tion of seismic perturbation. Two techniques, origin-destination (0-D) betweenness, 
introduced before for measuring component centrality, and NodeRank, an impor-
tance metric based on the PageRank algorithm used by Google also introduced in the 
background section, are used for the purpose of identification of critical components 
in networks. As discussed in Chapter 2, NodeRank ranks network nodes through 
a combination of fragility values and the results of the PageRank algorithm. The 
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PageRank ranking estimates are based purely on the topological properties of the 
network, while NodeRank combines such estimates with the inherent fragility of each 
component. In the case of origin-destination (0-D) betweenness, the metric measures 
the number of shortest paths that use a given component when connecting the supply 
and consumption nodes in a network. 
The effectiveness of the implementation plans for the introduced mitigation mea-
sures is tested under different conditions of interdependence strength and seismic 
scenarios by measuring resulting fragility reductions for a selected performance limit 
state. The following sections explain in detail the mitigation measures and discuss 
the results obtained from an extensive test case study of two interdependent urban 
networks based of models of real interconnected systems. 
4.1 Mitigation strategies 
Two mitigation strategies are used as conceptual measures to reduce the impact of 
seismic perturbation on systemic fragility: 1) Component Fragility Reduction, C F R 
and 2) Interdependence Redundancy Enhancement, IRE. 
Component Fragility Reduction, CF R, reduces the fragility of a selected group 
of nodes by a fixed percentage of their original value. The nodes to intervene are 
chosen based on their importance for systemic stability and their known fragility to 
a threat under consideration as determined by a proposed ranking strategy based on 
centrality measures. The objective of implementing this type of action is to measure 
the effectiveness of limited (and hence financially feasible) local fragility mitigation on 
reducing systemic fragility under different conditions of interdependence with other 
networks. 
Interdependence Redundancy Enhancement, IRE, explores the potential of inter-
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(a) Component Fragility Reduction , CFR 
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(b) Interdependence Redundancy Enhancement, 
IRE 
Figure 4.1 : Representations of the basic actions used in the conceptual mitigation 
strategies considered in this chapter. Fig. 4.1 (a) represents how the C F R strategy 
decreases the component fragility of selected crit ical components. Fig. 4.1(b) shows 
how the IRE policy increases the number of addit ional supply lines (interdependence 
links) for dependent nodes in all networks. 
vening the linking interface existing between interdependent networks as a measure 
to reduce systemic fragility for all interacting networks. The IRE strategy works by 
adding new interdependence links to the existing interdependence interface with the 
aim of reducing the likelihood of interdependent damage transmission [Fig. 4.1 (b)]. 
Under the IRE strategy, for a given slave node whose functionality depends on 
the survival of a single master node , adding an interdependence link is equivalent 
to providing an additional supply channel for the dependent node. In the updated 
condition, the failure of the slave node will be conditional not on the failure of a single 
master node, but on the failure of two of t hem, an event which, if properly designed , 
will have a reduced likelihood compared with that of the original interdependence 
arrangement. Note that this measure reduces the effective fragility by adding connec-
tions (link redundancy) between facilities rather than by intervening on the fragility 
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of facilities, thus representing a direct application of the failure avoidance paradigm 
for interdependence propagation introduced in Section 2.5 (Fig. 2.5). This differ-
ence implies that IRE actions may result in a lower total mitigation cost than its 
C F R counterpart, as it may be the case that adding connecting elements requires 
less monetary expense than reducing the fragility of a complete facility. 
4.2 Case study 3: conceptual mitigation strategies for two 
test interdependent networks under seismic scenarios 
This case study uses the two familiar simplified power and water networks from Shelby 
county, TN, US as a test bed. The networks are subjected to the seven seismic sce-
narios used in the previous case studies (Case Studies 1 and 2); however, for the 
sake of brevity the systemic fragilities of the test networks are calculated now only 
for the conditions of complete independence (I str = 0.0) and full interdependence 
(I str = 1. 0), that is the two extreme values of the I str parameter. The interde-
pendence matrices used for the description of the interconnection interface between 
the test networks are the same as used in previous case studies, but note that they 
eventually change under the influence of the IRE mitigation policy. 
Unlike the two previous case studies, the fragility of the water network has been 
enriched by the inclusion of the possibility of link failure and by the redefinition of 
the failure of water consumption nodes as a function of the potential disconnection 
brought upon them by the failure of their associated links. In the two previous case 
studies the fragility of such points depended essentially on the failure of its neighbors 
or in more general terms in their disconnection from surviving internal supply nodes. 
The inclusion of link fragility obeys to the fact that several earthquake experiences 
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(EERI, 2010; Eidinger et al., 2010) have shown that water link failures substantially 
contribute to the loss of service during an earthquake and to the time required for 
repairs in the event's aftermath. In this regard, O'Rourke and Lui (1999) state that 
failure in water pipes is mainly due to either permanent ground movements or wave 
propagation associated to Peak Ground Velocity, PGV. Of these two causes, this 
case study models the most common of the two, wave propagation damage, while 
leaving permanent ground movement fragility as a key aspect to include in future 
developments. Noticeably, recent research on this topic (Wu and Duenas-Osorio, 
2012) has partially incorporated the issue of ground movement in the study of water 
network fragility. 
To estimate the link fragility associated to wave propagation, this case study uses 
the expression proposed by Adachi and Ellingwood (2009a) reproduced here in Eq. 
4.1, 
JE[PJ] = 1- exp ( -C x L x J-LPGV) (4.1) 
In Eq. 4.1, JE[P1] is the expected probability of failure of the pipe under study; 
C = K x 0.00187, where K is a parameter obtained as a function of pipe diameter and 
material; L is the pipe length; and J-LPGV is the average value of PGV over the pipe 
length. Using this equation, the water link fragility is included in the simulation of 
hazard action of scenarios in the IFA algorithm, specifically at the DHA stage. The 
resulting link status obtained in a given scenario are used to determine the survival of 
the network consumption elements. Under this strategy, consumption nodes become 
failed elements if their associated pipelines fail, that is the consumption point is left 
isolated from surviving network portions and specifically from the internal supply 
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nodes and associated paths. 
4.2.1 Seismic perturbation and ranking strategies results 
The interdependent test power and water networks are subjected to a sweep of seismic 
hazard scenarios propagated based on the seismology of the Shelby County area. Each 
of these scenarios is identified by the maximum PGA estimated for the locations of 
the different components as in the two previous test cases. These scenarios span the 
same interval from 0.1g to 0.7g with a sampling step of 0.1g. For the water network 
case, the PGV at each node is calculated as a function of the PGA at the same 
locations, with the average PGV over a pipe length (required in Eq. 4.1) estimated 
as the arithmetic average of the PGVs at the link's initial and terminal nodes. 
With regard to ranking strategies, Table 4.1 presents the ranking results for both 
networks using NodeRank and 0-D betweenness. Both methodologies are applied 
to the test networks considering their topology and node fragility in the case of 
NodeRank, and the number of connecting paths using a given network node when 
connecting supply and consumption nodes in the case of 0-D betweenness, for their 
comparison of the importance of a component for the survival of the network it 
belongs to. This table displays rankings for the top 10% (six power nodes and five 
water nodes) and 20% (twelve power nodes and ten water nodes) most fragile (for 
CFR) and top strong (for IRE) nodes in both networks according to the the ranking 
strategies Node Rank ( N R in the table) and 0-D betweenness ( 0-D btwn in the 
table). The percentages of intervention represent the author estimation of maximum 
allowable intervention rates that can take place at the same time for a network under 
the two modes of intervention (basic and extended) explored in the test case. These 
values are not meant to be fixed and they can be adjusted without a loss on the 
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generali ty of the approaches discussed in this section. 
Table 4.1 : Ranking IDNs results for Power (SI) and Water (S2 ) nodes using the 
NodeRank (NR ) and origin-destination ( 0-D) betweenness ranking strategies. Selec-
tion of the top 10% of nodes produces lists of 6 nodes and 5 nodes for sl and s2, 
respectively. 
Basic 
Cases 
(1-6) 
Extended 
Cases 
(7 -12) 
CFR IRE 
~ ~ 
Power (5t) Water (52 ) Power (S!) Water (52 ) 
NR 0 -D btwn NR 0-D btwn NR 0-D btwn NR 0-D btwn 
7 
2 
4 
4 
6 
2 
12 
9 
11 
8 
15 
11 
14 
39 
31 
37 
35 
12 
17 
15 
14 
12 
15 
10 
g 
11 
13 
15 
4 
4.2.2 Mitigation strategies and comparison cases 
The two conceptual mitigation strategies are designed based on the two sets of rank-
ings presented above (Fig. 4.1) and on a fixed fragility mitigation level (25% for C F R) 
or interdependence interface enhancement (one additional interdependence link under 
IRE ), respectively. These combinations produce six basic cases of mitigation along 
with six additional cases exploring the effects of more intense actions. Note that as 
for t he case of the number of ranked nodes reported in Fig. 4.1 , the intervention 
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characteristics of the C F R and IRE mitigation policies represent the author esti-
mations of reasonable policies in real cases; in any case, the values can be adapted 
to reflect a different type of rationality without affecting the generality of the policy 
implementation. 
In the following description of cases, the NodeRank ranking is identified as ranking 
1, while the 0-D betweenness ranking is referred to as ranking 2. The first two 
basic mitigation cases (cases 1 and 2) result from applying CFR to the independent 
networks (I str = 0) using the top 10% fragile nodes (6 nodes for 81; 5 nodes for 
S2) from the rankings 1 and 2, respectively. The next two cases, cases 3 and 4, use 
rankings 1 and 2 to test the effects of CF R with 25% fragility reduction on a fully 
interdependent version of the two test networks. Note that both NR and origin-
destination betweenness are used simultaneously in every comparison case. 
The final two cases, cases 5 and 6, use the top 10% strong nodes in both networks to 
assess the impact of IRE on the fully interdependent (I str = 1.0) test networks. Note 
that the strong nodes are used to identify safe sources for the new interdependence 
links created by IRE. For cases 5 and 6, each slave node is attached to an additional 
master node as a mean to diversify its external dependence. 
The six additional cases, cases 7 to 12, test the effects of mitigation action inten-
sification. For these extended cases involving C F R (cases 7 to 10), the mitigation is 
intensified by increasing the number of nodes with 25% reduced fragility from 10% to 
20% (12 nodes for 81 ; 10 nodes for 8 2 ) of the total number of nodes for each network. 
The final extended cases 11 and 12 increase the IRE mitigation level by adding two 
interdependence links to each slave node instead of the single one added in the basic 
cases. 
In addition to the 12 cases described, cases 100 and 101 are used to study the 
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baseline response of both networks before mitigation for the independent and fully 
interdependent conditions, respectively. Two extra cases, labeled as cases 200 and 
201, study the effects of a combination of CF Rand IRE. Cases 200 and 201 use the 
definition of case 3 ( C F R, 25%, I str = 1.0) and add to it one and two interdependence 
links, respectively, to each existing slave node to define mixed CF R +IRE cases. 
4.2.3 Results and discussion of mitigation policies 
Resulting systemic fragilities for each of the mitigation cases are discussed here as 
the probability of a network exceeding a 50% Connectivity Loss (CL ~ 0.5) obtained 
after 10 000 simulations for all hazard scenarios. Table 4.2 summarizes the systemic 
fragilities estimated for each network under each mitigation scenario. Fragility results 
are obtained by averaging the change in fragility over all seismic hazard scenarios. 
Note that this procedure implicitly assumes that all earthquake scenarios are of the 
same likelihood. This assumption is naturally unrealistic and highlights the need for 
complete probabilistic description of earthquake hazard, a challenge handled in this 
thesis in Chapter 5. The percentages in parenthesis are calculated with respect to the 
fragility values of the baseline cases: case 100 for independent networks (I str = 0) 
and case 101 for complete interdependence (I str = 1.0). 
Fig. 4.2 shows typical fragility results used for the calculation of the unweighted 
averages in Table 4.2. The systemic fragility curves in this figure correspond to the 
baseline cases 100 (I str = 0.0) and 101 (I str = 1.0). The solid curves show mean 
probability of the systemic Connectivity Loss metric exceeding 0.5 as a function of 
PGA. The dashed curves show the relative error of the estimated mean Probabilities 
of EXceedance (PEX) as a function of the same PGA values. Note that this relative 
error is of consideration only at PGA = 0.1g, a scenario with small impact on final 
100 
Table 4.2 : Summary of results for mitigation cases. Amounts in parentheses show 
the reduction as a percentage of the corresponding base case. All percentages indicate 
fragility reduction. (* 2 links added) 
Case ID 
Baseline 
Cases 
Mixed 
Cases 
mit igation decisions. 
100 
101 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
g 
10 
11 
12 
200 
201 
Power (St) Water (S2) 
I str Ranking Intervention IE[P{C L 2: 0.5)] IE[P (CL 2: 0.5)] 
Baseline cases: No intervention 
0 .0 0.65 (bl) 0.33 (bl) 
1.0 0.66 {bl) 0.56 (bl) 
Basic cases: 10% of nodes intervened or intd . link added 
0.0 NR CF R 0.60 (7.7%) 
0.0 0 -D btwn CFR 0.61 (6.2%) 
1.0 NR CFR 0.61 (7.6%) 
1.0 0-D btwu CFR 0.61 (7.6%) 
1.0 NR I RE 0.65 (1.5%) 
1.0 0 -D btwn I RE 0.65 (1.5%) 0.52 (7.1 %) 
Extended cases: number of nodes/links intervened dou 
0.0 NR CF R 0.58 (10.8%) 
0 .0 0 -D btwn CFR 0.60 (7.7%) 
1.0 NR CF R 0.58 (12.1%) 
1.0 0-D btwn C F R 0.61 (7.6%) 
1.0 NR I RE 0.65 (1.5%) 
1.0 0 -D btwu IRE 0.65 (1.5%) 
Mi.xed CFR + IRE cases 
1.0 NR C F R + IRE 0.60 (9. 1%) 
1.0 NR C FR + IRE• 0.58 {12.1%) 
For t he I str = 0.0 plot [Fig. 4.2(a)], the power network 's PEX curve shows 
consistently fragility values higher or equal (equality at PG A = 0.1g) than t he water 
network 's curve (min. difference: 0 at PGA = 0.1g; max. difference: 0.91 at PGA = 
0.3g), a result consistent with the component fragility curves in Fig. 3.5(a) in which 
the fragility of the critical power supply nodes surpasses the fragility of t he water 
network supply elements. For the I str = 1.0 plot [Fig. 4.2(b )], the fragility differences 
between the two networks decrease not iceably as observed from comparing cases 100 
Cl target level 
* Power 51 ("-{f'-.;, 
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(a ) Baseline systemic fragilities for I str = 0 
101 
(b) Baseline systemic fragili ties for I str = 1.0 
Figure 4.2 : CL > 0.5 systemic fragility curves for both test networks under inde-
pendent (Istr = 0.0, Fig. 4.2(a)) and fully interdependent (Istr = 1.0, Fig. 4.2(b)) 
conditions. Networks have not undergone mitigation. 
and 101. Table 4.2 indicates interdependence effects induced an average fragility 
increase of 1.5% for the power network and of 69.7% for the water network. 
On one hand , the magnitude of these changes emphasizes the fact that negative 
interdependence effects contribute greatly to the water network fragility increase. 
On the other hand, the interdependence effects of the water network on the power 
network are minimal as evidenced in previous case studies. The particular behavior 
of t he power system can be explained by both its own fragility [Fig. 3.5(a)] that 
allows little capacity to be damaged by external agents (for PGA ;::: 0.4g) , and by 
the strength of the water network whose connectivity survival reduces the likelihood 
of interdependence damage transmission from internal cascades. 
The basic mitigation cases provide an additional source of insights. In the first 
place, for I str = 0, C F R basic cases 1 and 2, the 10% node mitigation achieves a 
maximum (with respect to other comparison cases) 7.7% fragility reduction for the 
power network and a maximum 21.2% reduction for the water system. These results 
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can be interpreted as a limited outcome for the power network and a more satisfactory 
impact in the water network when both networks are independent. Nevertheless, 
the duplication of efforts in the extended cases (cases 7 and 8) does not lead to a 
proportional improvement in the fragility conditions. This situation is specially clear 
in the case of the power network achieving a 10.8% fragility reduction in case 7. Case 
7 performs best for the water network in achieving a 27.3% fragility reduction close 
to the duplication value with respect to case 1 (15.1%). 
The performance of the networks under I str = 1.0, C F R basic cases 3 and 4, is 
noticeable as they achieve the same reduction values for both networks (7.6% and 
7.1% for the power and water network, respectively). Such parity does not exist in 
the extended cases (cases 9 and 10) in which case 9 performs better than case 10 for 
the power network (12.1% against 7.6%), and case 10 surpasses case 9's effects on the 
water network (12.5% against 8.9% reduction). 
A comparison across I str values of the aggregate fragility-reduction effectiveness of 
the two ranking strategies (NR and 0-D betweenness) shows that 0-D betweenness 
is slightly more effective than N R for the C F R base cases mostly due to its impact on 
the water network (case 2). However, the NR strategy shows a marginal advantage 
over 0-D betweenness for the CF R extended cases of mitigation. This switching 
trend and the clearly different network responses to mitigation allows to state that the 
effectiveness of a local fragility reduction mitigation measure depends on the ranking 
strategy, the magnitude of the mitigation, and the conditions of interdependence and 
component fragility of the affected networks. Hence, several ranking alternatives 
ought to be tested in order to find the best fit for each particular case; that is, no 
particular preference can be suggested for general applications based on the results 
of this case study. 
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Beyond the ranking comparison point, the four C F R basic cases (cases 1 to 4) 
and their extended cases (cases 7 to 10) in Table 4.2 show that the CFR mitigation 
policy does decrease interdependent fragility, but the achieved reduction rates are 
almost never as satisfactory as in the case of independent networks. Indeed, while 
the maximum reduction ratio under CFR for Istr = 0 is 30.3% (case 8, water net-
work), the maximum reduction for Istr = 1.0 is 12.5% (case 10, water network). 
This outcome highlights how the presence of interdependence complicates the task of 
fragility control. However, at the same time, the same outcome supports the need 
for adequate interdependence description for a correct evaluation of seismic systemic 
fragility and mitigation. 
The results of the IRE basic cases (cases 5 and 6) show a marginal effect of 
this mitigation policy on the power network and a considerable impact on the water 
system. The same trends are observed in the IRE extended cases (cases 11 and 12). 
In the extended cases, the power network remains at its base case value of fragility 
reduction (1.5%), that is, the addition of an extra interdependence link does not 
reduce its fragility any further. However, for the water network, the additional extra 
link increases the maximum reduction from 7.1% (case 6) to 12.5% (case 11). This 
response reflects the negative influence of the dependence of the water network on 
power network elements and shows a potentially very effective way of limiting its 
effects, without the need for intensive facility-level retrofits. 
In terms of ranking comparison, the review of the IRE results shows that max-
imum fragility reductions are achieved under different rankings and not consistently 
under one of them. However, the magnitude of the differences between the values 
is insufficient to create a preference in this case study. Note also that IRE is able 
to match the fragility reduction levels brought by CF R in basic and extended cases 
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for the water network but not for the power system. Again, this is a clear indication 
that IRE targets the negative interdependent effects from the power network increas-
ing the water network fragility, but it is, by its own definition, unable to reduce the 
mostly inherent fragility of the power network. 
Finally, Fig. 4.3 registers the systemic fragility curves for the mixed C F R + 
IRE cases 200 and 201. The comparison of the curves shows that adding an extra 
interdependence link in case 201 (for a total of 3 per slave node) leads to a maximum 
additional fragility reduction of 0.15 (PEX at PGA = 0.3g) for the power network and 
of 0.22 (PEX at PGA = 0.4g) for the water system compared to the initial reductions 
in case 200. The comparison of these new plots with the baseline case 101 [Fig. 4.2(b)] 
reveals the important gains achieved by mitigation. However, comparing these plots 
with the fragilities in the case of network independence [Fig. 4.2(a)J demonstrates that 
additional mitigation for interdependence could generate further fragility reductions 
per network; that is that the intensity of the mitigation or more mitigation actions 
could be added to provide additional gains in fragility reduction. As a final note, 
Table 4.2 shows that case 200 slightly surpasses the fragility reductions brought by 
the addition of cases 3 and 5. This result indicates that mixed mitigation strategies 
must be considered as potential optimal mitigation strategies. 
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Figure 4.3 : C L > 0.5 systemic fragility curves for both test networks under I str = 1.0 
and combined CF R and IRE mitigation policies. With CF R mitigation intensity 
fixed, Fig. 4.3(a) shows the effects of a IRE policy adding a single link , while Fig. 
4.3(b) shows the effects of a IRE policy adding two interdependence links to each 
dependent node. 
Chapter 5 
Probabilistic Fragility of Interdependent 
Infrastructure Networks under 
Network-Consistent Seismic Hazard 
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5.1 Generation of Network-Consistent Seismic Fragility Es-
timates 
When an earthquake occurs, seismic intensities impact almost simultaneously all the 
exposed sites in a network. The collective effect of such perturbation makes the net-
work as a whole reach an undesirable performance level according to the magnitude, 
the distance, and soil conditions for the event and network locations. This description 
of systemic seismic damage expects a certain degree of correlation to exist between 
the intensities at different network locations. A useful mechanism to fulfill this re-
quirement is the use of seismic intensity maps for hazard description and subsequent 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
A catalog of intensity maps preserves in each map the expected correlation of 
hazard intensities between locations and allows a direct association between the map, 
its likelihood and the systemic performance calculated using the map as an input the 
three basic elements required for the assessment of expected systemic performance. In 
the case of intensity maps, the stochastic nature of seismic hazard requires the use of a 
sizable collection of them as well as their probabilities of occurrence. The generation 
of such maps must properly represent the seismological features, the activity, and 
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the variability of the seismogenic sources while also limiting the number of maps 
used in fragility calculations for the sake of computational efficiency and practical 
implementations. The importance of the computational demand factor only increases 
when additional operations are necessary for the generation of each intensity map 
(use of a ground motion model, for example), as it is the case for the interdependent 
systemic fragility assessment procedure introduced in this thesis. 
This chapter describes the integration of network-consistent earthquake hazard 
with interdependent systemic fragility assessment. The seismic hazard assessment 
methodology discussed here is based on Jayaram and Baker (2010), who provide a 
strategy for the efficient construction of an earthquake catalog based on Importance 
Sampling (IS), a variance reduction technique for Monte Carlo simulation. The appli-
cation of the IS technique reduces the number of required intensity maps compared 
to regular Monte Carlo simulation. At the same time, the IS formulation delivers 
formulae for the mean and variance estimates of Annual Probabilities of EXceedance 
(APEX) for probabilistic interdependent systemic performance assessment executed 
using the sample seismic maps as input. This calculation of annual probabilities of 
exceedance for the fragility of interdependent networks is a unique contribution of 
this thesis. 
The calculation of APEX values includes the probability of occurrence of the inten-
sity maps used in the estimation, a feature that makes the resulting APEX-Systemic 
Performance pairs unconditional probabilistic estimates. This unconditional property 
represents a positive departure from the previous developments in this thesis which 
generated fragility estimates based on selected seismic scenarios, that is a few selected 
seismic intensity maps. The ASPIS (Assessment of network-consistent Seismic ex-
ceedance Probabilities for Interdependent Systemic Performance) algorithm described 
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in this chapter compiles the steps required for the generation of seismic intensity 
maps, the calculation of interdependent systemic performance (IFA algorithm), and 
the final calculation of APEX estimates for different levels of systemic performance. 
The fragility estimates obtained using this approach are unconditional properly in-
elude the probabilistic features of the seismic hazard and the inherent variability of 
component fragility and interdependence strength, properties that make these re-
sults suitable to be used in decision making regarding maintenance or intervention 
measures for interdependent urban infrastructure. 
5.1.1 Importance Sampling procedure for the generation of hazard see-
narios 
Kroese et al. (2011) state that a simple Importance Sampling procedure transforms 
the integral in Eq. 5.1 into the expression in Eq. 5.2 through the multiplication and 
division by an auxiliary importance sampling density g(x). 
l = JEJ[H(X)] = j H(x)f(x) dx (5.1) 
In Eq. 5.1, lE stands for the first moment or expectation, H for a function whose 
expectation is of interest, and f for the nominal probability density function involved 
in the moment estimation. Its modified version is as shown below: 
J f(x) [ f(X)] l = H(x) g(x) g(x) dx = lE9 H(X) g(X) . (5.2) 
If xl, ... 'XN are independent, identically distributed samples from g(x), then 
the integral in Eq. 5.2 can be approximated as 
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(5.3) 
with i standing for an unbiased estimator of the expectation, and the ratio of densities 
Wk = f(Xk)/g(Xk) identified as the weight or likelihood ratio for sample k, with k 
going from 1 toN, with N being the number of samples used in the approximation. 
The formulae for the basic Importance Sample scheme can be extended to a 
Weighted Importance Sample ( WIS) version after considering that lE9 [W(X)] = 1, 
(given that f(Xk) is a probability density function) which allows for an alternative 
expression of the expectation in Eq. 5.2 as 
l = lE9 [H(X)W(X)] 
JE9 [W(X)] (5.4) 
with its estimator i expressed as in Eq. 5.5, which is the expression used in Jayaram 
and Baker (2010) for the definition of an unbiased estimator of a random variable 
using the importance sampling procedure. 
(5.5) 
Finally, if the sampling is done sequentially, the weight for a sample X= (X1 , ... , Xn), 
is calculated as 
W(x) = fi(x1)h(x21x1) · .. fn(xniXl:n-l). 
g1(x1)g2(x2!x1) · · · gn(XniXl:n-l) (5.6) 
The next section discusses the application of this Sequential Weighted Importance 
Sampling (SWIS) strategy for the estimation of the probabilistic performance of sin-
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gle urban networks. The next section discuss the extension of this methodology to 
interdependent urban networks. 
5.1.2 SWIS for systemic performance assessment 
Jayaram and Baker (2010) use the indicator function I(l0 ) as the H(X) target function 
[Eq. 5.1] to estimate the probability of a network exceeding the performance levell0 , 
P(L 2: l 0 ), as defined by Eq. 5.7, 
P(L 2: lo) = lE [J(l 2: lo)] = J I(l(x) 2: l0 )f(x) dx (5.7) 
with I(l 2: lo) equal to zero for performance values smaller than the threshold lo and 
one for values reaching or exceeding the same limit. 
Using the approximation expression in Eq. 5.5 the estimator P of the APEX for 
l0 is (Eq. 5.8) 
(5.8) 
Finally, Eq. 5.9 presents the expression for the variance of the estimator of the 
mean. 
(5.9) 
The key requirements for the calculation of the mean and variance of P(L 2: 
l0 ) in the previous two equations are the values of lk and wk, the specific systemic 
performance reduction calculated using a sampled map, and the weight or likelihood of 
the sampled map, respectively. The first of these parameters can be calculated using 
the IFA algorithm introduced in Section 3, while the second parameter, the weight of 
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the sample map, depends on the sampling procedure used for the map's generation. 
The steps of this sampling procedure involved seismological concepts and a set of 
assumptions which are described in the next subsection. 
5.1.3 Simulation of seismic intensity maps 
The calculation of intensities for a seismic map is executed using a Ground Motion 
Model (GMM). A ground motion model is a mathematical model developed with the 
objective of obtaining seismic intensities based on the magnitude of an earthquake 
and the distance of its source from target locations. 
In the procedure required to simulate a seismic map, the first step samples a mag-
nitude from the probability distribution used to describe the capacity of a set of faults 
to generate earthquakes of different magnitudes [Fig. 5.1(b)]. Once magnitude and 
fault originating the earthquake are established, the GMM is employed to estimate 
the sought seismic intensities at the different network location required for running 
the IFA algorithm. The GMM used in this work follows the expression in Eq. 5.10: 
(5.10) 
In Eq. 5.10, the seismic intensity of interest is the spectral acceleration Saz at 
a network component site z under a given earthquake magnitude and distance from 
the event source to the z site. The same formula with different internal parameters, 
applies for the estimation of other seismic intensity parameters including Peak Ground 
Velocity, PGV, or Peak Ground Acceleration, PGA. 
The first term of Eq. 5.10 is the median value of seismic intensity which is cal-
culated using a deterministic expression within the GMM model; the second term is 
the intraevent residual, and the third term is the interevent residual. Of the three 
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terms, the last two contain a random variable in the normalized parameters, E, the 
intraevent residual, and, 'f/, the interevent residual. 
The intraevent residual term (o-t:) attempts to capture intensity variability be-
tween different points (at different geographical locations) during the same earth-
quake event. The interevent residual term (r'fJ) represents the intensity variability 
at same distances induced by different earthquake realizations (Wesson and Perkins, 
2001). The estimation of the deterministic values of the standard deviation terms o-
and T depends on the intensity parameter (Sa, PGA, or PGV) and on the properties 
of the component at the location of interest (vibration period for Sa, for example). 
Both parameters o- and T are provided by the GMM used in this work [See Boore 
et al. (2003)]. At the same time, E and"' are standard normal random variables from 
which a single realization is required for the evaluation of Eq. 5.10. 
Typically, GMMs require the magnitude and the distance from the earthquake 
location to the network site [Fig. 5.1(b)]. Distances can be found using a GIS tool, 
while the magnitude sample requires a simulation draw. At the same time, such a 
draw requires the probability distribution of the full fault set inducing a given sampled 
magnitude m. 
For a set of nf fault sources with individual probability density functions (pdfs) for 
magnitude generation fi(m), the complete probability density f(m) representing the 
potential of all seismogenic sources of inducing a given magnitude can be estimated 
using the total probability rule as shown in Eq. 5.11: 
(5.11) 
with v representing the activity rates of each fault j, which can be estimated using 
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their seismological properties [See Youngs and Coppersmith (1985), Eq. 11]. 
f(m) fm,., f(m)dm 
m, Sa (g) 
m, 
site 
m 
(a) Stratified Sampling (b) GMM illustration 
Figure 5.1 : Generation of seismic intensity maps . a) Stratified sampling using f(m) 
which focuses the sampling on large earthquake magnitudes; b) Interaction between 
magnitude (M0 ), fault, and distance (dstk) in a GMM for the estimation of seismic 
intensities (Sa in the image). 
Regular sampling using f( m) would produce samples of small magnitude with high 
probability of occurrence but limited impact on systemic performance equivalent to 
wasted computational resources. To counter this, the first step in the Sequential 
Weighted Importance Sampling (SWIS) procedure uses a sampling strategy that di-
vides or stratifies the sampling domain of seismic magnitudes. Fig. 5.1(a) illustrates 
the stratification concept. In this division, a single magnitude sample mi is taken from 
each sampling interval. The weight or likelihood ratio for each sampled magnitude 
mi is calculated as (Eq. 5.12): 
J:::kk+l f(m)dm 
1/nm 
(5.12) 
with mk and mk+l defining the lower and upper bounds of the ith sampling interval , 
respectively. The integral on the numerator, the area under f(m) for the interval 
[mk mk+I] associated to mi , corresponds to the likelihood of choosing a sample from 
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that particular interval, while the denominator specifies the probability of selecting 
any of the nm sampled magnitudes. The probability in the numerator is controlled 
by f(m), while the one in the denominator states that once sampled, the probability 
of choosing any of the sampled magnitudes is the same: 1/nm. 
Once a magnitude is sampled, it is necessary to identify which fault from the fault 
set could cause the event. This second step in the SWIS strategy uses Bayes' theorem 
to calculate the probability of a fault j being the source of a known magnitude m as 
shown in Eq. 5.13: 
(5.13) 
The partial weight associated to fault selection is calculated after considering that 
the value of f(jlm) can be larger than zero for many of the faults, that is, there 
might be more than one potential source for the sampled magnitude as more than 
one fault could produce the sampled magnitude. If the total count of such active 
faults is n1(m), Eq. 5.14 shows the likelihood ratio for an individual fault j causing 
the sampled magnitude: 
f(jlm) f(jlm) 
= g(jlm) 1/nJ(m) · (5.14) 
For the two remaining terms of Eq. 5.10, (Yf. and T'fJ, the required samples forE and 
'fJ are taken from normal distributions, but their treatment differs for the intraevent 
and interevent terms. Jayaram and Baker (2008) showed that normalized intraevent 
residuals (t) at k locations follow a multivariate normal distribution. In practice, this 
fact implies that obtaining intraevent samples requires a correlation matrix E. The 
same authors in Jayaram and Baker (2009) provide an expression for the estimation 
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of such correlation structure (Eq. 5.15), 
P<s<t = exp( -3h/ R) (5.15) 
with s and t standing for two different network sites, h the distance in km between 
the same sites, and R the distance parameter in km controlling the decay of spatial 
correlations. The values of p fill the off-diagonal locations of the correlation matrix 
E, while ones fill its diagonal. The value of the R parameter depends on the intensity 
measure of interest and different estimates are available in the literature (See Espos-
ito and Iervolino (2011), or Goda and Hong (2008), for example). Based on these 
references, the R value used in the case study at the end of this chapter is fixed at 10 
km. More information on the nature and estimation procedures for the R parameter 
can be found in the references cited above. 
With the correlation structure available, the sampling of intraevent values is 
straightforward. However, conventional sampling from the standard multivariate nor-
mal distribution would produce an inefficient number of close-to-the mean samples. 
To address such situation, Jayaram and Baker (2010) propose a strategy based on 
shifting the mean by an msintra value, aiming to obtain samples more likely to induce 
significant changes on the seismic intensities. This third stage of the SWIS process 
generates a sample vector e sampling from the multivariate normal distribution with 
a vector of means msintra and the square correlation matrix E. The length of e and 
the numbers of rows of E are equal to the number of nodes in the network under 
study. 
The weight for the third stage is shown in Eq. 5.16. In this case, the weight 
ratio can be interpreted as a correction factor between the original distribution and 
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the shifted one used for the sampling. Jayaram and Baker (2010) note that the shift 
value must be selected with care in order to obtain the desired outcome, and so they 
provide a diagram (not reproduced here. See Jayaram and Baker (2010), Fig. 1c) for 
obtaining msintra values as a function of the number of sites and the average distance 
between them. 
f(e) ( 1 T -1 1 T -1 ) g(e) = exp 2(e- msintra) E (e- msintra)- 2e E e . (5.16) 
Finally, a similar approach to sampling and weight calculation applies to the 
fourth SWIS stage: the interevent factor. First, note that because of its definition, 
the product in the interevent residual TrJ must be held constant for all sites for a given 
seismic map. Given that values forT are provided by the GMM as a function of the 
spectral period of the component at a site, the TJ values must be fixed to comply with 
the invariability requirement. Jayaram and Baker (2010) enforce the requirement by 
obtaining a simulated value t for one of the points (say t1. for site 1) and calculating 
the tk values for the remaining sites as (Eq. 5.17) 
(5.17) 
The sampling itself of the first TJ (t1 in the previous illustration) is executed using 
a standard univariate normal distribution shifted by an amount msinter specified by 
Jayaram and Baker (2010) after numerical testing to be in the range between 0.5 and 
1.0. The weight associated to the interevent residual including the shifting parameter 
is calculated using Eq. 5.18. The interpretation of the weight ratio as a correction 
factor is applied to this calculation as well. 
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f(t) (1 2 1 2) g(t) = exp 2(t- msinter) - 2t . (5.18) 
with t the interevent sample used as referent for the calculation of all other t values. 
The four sequential weights obtained for each of the sampling stages can be com-
piled to form the weight of a given scenarioS. From Eq. 5.5, the weight for scenario 
S = (m,j, e, t) can be written as (Eq. 5.19) 
W(S) = f(S) = f(m)f(jlm)f(e)j(t) 
g(S) g(m)g(jlm)g(e)g(t) · (5.19) 
The previous discussion applies to the construction of a single intensity map. 
However, it is evident that the second step of the SWIS procedure, the Bayesian fault 
procedure, may lead to a family of maps branching out from a common magnitude 
sample. Moreover, the addition of the interevent and intraevent samples certainly 
creates additional cases branching out from a single magnitude-fault pair. If the sam-
pling domain for magnitudes is divided in nm intervals under the stratified sampling 
strategy, the number of faults is limited to n f, and a ness number of independent com-
binations of intraevent and interevent samples are considered, the maximum number 
of intensity maps to process for the sought APEX mean and variance estimates is 
equal to the product (nm) (nJ) (ness)· This estimation provides valuable insight into 
the computational requirements of the SWIS procedure in the light of the additional 
expense implied by the use of the IFA algorithm for each of the sampled maps, in the 
quest for unconditional interdependent performance assessments. 
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5.1.4 Seismic intensity maps and interdependent systemic fragility as-
sessment 
The intensity maps and weights generated by the SWIS procedure are used as input 
to simulate interdependent systemic performance using the IFA algorithm. At this 
point, the simulation is handling two sources of uncertainty. The first source comes 
from the hazard simulation itself, and it is assessed by the SWIS process in the 
variance calculation of Eq. 5.9. A second source of uncertainty is caused by the 
fragilities of network components which is handled in the sampling procedures of the 
IFA algorithm. 
For any given scenario, the systemic performance value obtained from applying 
an intensity map to network elements is a random variable itself. Furthermore, the 
intrinsic variability of such random variable becomes more intricate when interdepen-
dence effects on performance are considered. This variability requires an additional 
simulation plan to determine the mean and variance of the systemic performance, 
such as C L, under the intensity conditions presented in the map. When such process 
has been completed for all the intensity maps in the catalog, the triad a) intensity 
map, b) mean systemic performance, and c) map weight can be used for the APEX 
estimation in Eq. 5.8. The integration of the two simulation plans, seismic hazard 
sampling under the SWIS approach and the IFA algorithm the for a single map is pre-
sented in the Assessment of network-consistent Seismic exceedance Probabilities for 
Interdependent Systemic Performance ASPIS algorithm below. Note that steps 18 
and 19 in ASPIS correspond to the execution of the IFA algorithm for interdependent 
systemic fragility estimation. 
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Algorithm 5.1 Assessment of network-consistent Seismic exceedance Probabilities 
for Interdependent Systemic Performance, ASPIS 
1: Load seismological information of faults 
2: Stratify magnitude domain 
3: for each sample interval i do 
4: Sample magnitude mi using f(m) (Eq.5.11) 1> SWIS step 1 
5: Calculate magnitude sampling weight f(mi)/g(mi) (Eq. 5.12) 1> lines 4-5 
6: Identify potential fault sources for mi (Eq. 5.13) 1> SWIS step 2 
7: 
8: 
for each potential source j do 
Calculate partial weight f(j!m)jg(j!m) (Eq. 5.14) 
1> lines 6-8 
9: Obtain intraevent sample e from multivariate normal distribution 
with mean msintra and correlation E l> SWIS step 3 
10: Calculate partial intraevent weight l> lines 9-10 (Eq. 5.16) 
11: Obtain interevent sample t from normal distribution N(msinter, 1). l> 
SWIS step 4 
12: Calculate partial interevent weight 1> lines 11-12 (Eq. 5.18) 
13: Compute total weight for the scenario (Eq. 5.19) 
14: Compute seismic intensities for all sites (Eq. 5.10) 
15: end for 
16: end for 
17: for each hazard intensity map do 
18: Provide seismic intensities at network sites as input for the IFA Algorithm 
19: Estimate Mean Systemic Performance (MSP) for the map 
20: Match MSP with scenario weight 
21: end for 
22: Estimate APEX using returned lists of MSPs and weights (Eq. 5.8) 
23: Estimate APEX estimator's variance (Eq. 5.9) 
5.2 Case Study 4: Interdependent Power and Water systems 
in an Actively Seismic Region 
This case study applies the ASPIS algorithm to two interdependent urban networks, 
highlighting data requirements and procedural details. This section describes the 
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seismic hazard sources, the interdependent urban networks, and the interdependence 
characteristics used in the illustrative application example. The section concludes 
with the interpretation of the resulting plots of annual probabilities of exceedance 
(APEX) versus systemic performance curves for the two test networks, which are 
critical for risk-informed decision-making. 
5.2.1 Generation of seismic intensity maps 
The hazard source is a system of ten realistic, yet from an unspecified location, faults 
localized with respect to the test utility networks as shown in Fig. 5.2(a). For initial 
testing, the stratification of the range of magnitudes used 24 sampling intervals. The 
first six intervals, from magnitudes 5 to 7, are of the same magnitude, (0.33 width) 
while the remaining 18, from magnitudes 7 to 7.9, were of 0.05 width. The msintra 
and msinter used in the simulation of intraevent and interevent samples, respectively, 
were made equal to zero as no shifting is used for the sampling (ASPIS alg. steps 9, 
11). This decision was made to reduce the complexity of the simulation procedure 
and seemed to have no impact on the resulting estimates obtained in this case study. 
The seismic intensity values for the hazard maps (ASPIS alg. step 14) were 
obtained using the Ground Motion Model (GMM) proposed by Boore et al. (2003). 
The estimated PGAs and PGVs served as input to simulate seismic direct damage in 
nodes and links (IFA alg. steps 2 to 4). 
For testing purposes, the total number of scenarios used in the simulation is the 
product of 24 sampled magnitudes, 10 faults, and 50 combinations of interevent and 
intraevent samples for a total of 12 000 seismic scenarios to explore. The total number 
of scenarios proved to be enough to provide stability in the performance estimates 
in this case study. For each of these scenarios, an independent simulation (IFA al-
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Figure 5.2: 5.2(a) Realistic faults and their relative unspecified location with respect 
to the test networks. 5.2(b) Test power and water networks with node IDNs and 
classification. 
gorithm) took place to obtain the mean estimate of the interdependent systemic 
performance for the networks . This simulation used 500 C L samples to arrive to the 
final mean estimates used in Eq. 5.8 for APEX calculations. 
This fourth test case explores interdependence effects by generating scenarios with 
complete absence, I str = 0, and full effect of interdependence, I str = 1.0. For 
simplicity one single I str value , either zero or one , is extended to all interdependence 
links in a single scenario. Naturally, the procedure allows the inclusion of independent 
I str values for each of the interdependence links in the simulated urban networks. 
5.2.2 Results and discussion 
Fig. 5.3 presents plots of Annual Probability of EXceedance (APEX) for different 
systemic performance ( C L) levels under three scenarios. The scenario in Fig. 5.3( a) 
considers I str = 1.0 and includes the effects of water link failures (See section 4.2). 
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Fig. 5.3(b) shows APEX results for a I str = 0 scenario with water link failures con-
sidered, while Fig. 5.3( c) shows estimates for I str = 0 omitting water link failures. 
The inclusion of the water link failures factors in the scenarios serves two purposes. 
First, it improves over an important factor not included by Hernandez-Fajardo and 
Duenas-Osorio (2011) in their original IFA algorithm; and second, it exhibits the influ-
ence of proper independent systemic characterization on probabilistic interdependent 
performance. 
The plots in Fig. 5.3 can be studied in pairs. A first study set, Set 1, contrasts 
Figs. 5.3(a) and Fig 5.3(b), with their difference [Fig 5.3(a) - Fig 5.3(b)] presented 
in Fig. 5.4(a). The two scenarios in Set 1 include the link failure factor but differ in 
their interdependence level, Istr = 1.0 for Fig 5.3(a) and Istr = 0.0 for Fig. 5.3(b). 
This difference in I str allows Set 1 to display the influence of interdependence effects 
on unconditional systemic performance. Fig 5.4(a) presents four trends. First, the 
APEX differences are all positive, meaning that the situation in Fig 5.3(a) is worse 
than the one in Fig. 5.3(b). Second, the APEX differences are mostly constant 
along the CL range, but such difference become smaller for larger CL values. It 
is also clear from the individual figures that the variance of the estimator becomes 
important for the same, large CL performance values. Third, the APEX differences 
are larger for the water system for most of the CL range (0 to 0.8) reflecting a larger 
impact of interdependence in the water network's APEXs than on the power system's 
performance. Finally, the largest APEX differences are 0.0158 at CL = 0.35 for the 
power network and 0.0566 at CL = 0.3 for the water system. 
A second study set, Set 2, contrasts the scenarios in Figs. 5.3(a) and 5.3(c). The 
differences between the two scenarios are presented in Fig. 5.4(b). Set 2 examines 
the APEX changes brought by full interdependence and water link failures to the net-
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Figure 5.3 : Summary of Annual Probabilities of test Power (51 ) and Water (S2) 
networks exceeding Connectivity Loss (CL) values for a) Istr = 1.0 and link failure , 
b) I str = 0.0 and link failure , and c) I str = 0.0 and no link failure. The inclusion 
of link failures and interdependence damage propagation increases significantly the 
water network 's APEX values. In contrast , the systemic performance of the power 
network shows limited sensibility to interdependent effects from the water network. 
work' systemic performance. F ig. 5.4(b) shows that these factors have an important 
influence on the water network, inducing a maximum APEX difference of 0.166 at 
C L = 0. 3. It is clear from the same figure that the APEX differences decrease as C L 
increases, a trend also observed in Set L For the power network , the APEX differ-
ences behave similarly to Set 1 remaining almost constant with a maximum difference 
of 0.038 at CL = 0.35 and decreasing sharply at the largest CL values. 
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Finally, Set 3 compares Fig. 5.3(b) with Fig. 5.3(c). This set measures the effect 
of the water link failures factor in the independent networks. The first trend from Fig. 
5.4(c) is that including link failures increases the APEX values for the water network , 
in this set up to a maximum APEX difference between the link-failures scenario (Fig. 
5.3(b)) and no-link-failures scenario (Fig. 5.3(c)) of 0.1194 at CL = 0.15. The 
results for the power network are interesting as no differences should occur for this 
set (I str = 0). The differences observed can be attributed to the internal variability 
of the systemic performance estimation, specifically the variability of the mean C L 
estimates used in the ASPIS algorithm (Step 19). 
The trends observed from the three comparison sets provide support for three 
statements for this case study. First, from Sets 2 and 3, it is clear that considering 
water link failures increases the APEX for the water network. This fact emphasizes 
the need for proper modeling of independent networks as a first basic step for more 
complex analysis. Second, from Sets 1 and 2, interdependent effects have a clear effect 
on the water network in which the maximum APEX difference increased from 0.056 
to 0.166. Moreover, these sets support the hypothesis that interdependence effects 
induce more damage in dependent networks with a considerable level of fragility of 
their own even when accounting for the considerable joint uncertainty of hazard and 
vulnerability. Finally, the power network also shows higher APEX values in both 
Sets 1 and 2, but the magnitude of the change is never as large as for the water 
network. Indeed, the power network profile in the plots of Fig. 5.3 changes very little 
for all scenarios and the APEX differences remain in the w-2 range in all study sets. 
This behavior supports the notion of an effectively decoupled power network as a 
result of its larger component-level fragility. Hernandez-Fajardo and Duenas-Osorio 
(2011), using the same test networks, propose a similar explanation based on results 
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from scenario-based earthquakes. In the light of this similarity, it is important to 
note that the results just described are unconditional systemic performance estimates 
independent from fixed scenario events and hence ready to use in risk-based decision-
making, and mitigation analysis, while accounting for life-cycle costs. 
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Figure 5.4 : APEX differences for comparative sets 1 through 3. Set a) compari-
son of Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b); b) comparison of figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(c); and c) 
comparison of figures 5.3(b) and 5.3(c). 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Research 
The study of the fragility of critical infrastructure is a basic task for private man-
agers and public stakeholders alike. The productivity of cities and the well-being of 
urban populations depend on the protection and continuous operation of infrastruc-
ture urban networks like the power grid, the gas infrastructure, or the water delivery 
systems. Their expansion, induced by growing urban population all over the world, 
has lead to an explosion in their interdependence, a phenomenon that although es-
sential for their normal functionality becomes a path for fragility interchange between 
systems in the event of external perturbation. This thesis focused on the study of 
the effects of interdependence on the fragility of urban systems subjected to the ac-
tion of earthquake perturbation. Such study was performed from the perspective of 
modeling interdependent infrastructure networks using a complex systems approach, 
that is using mathematical graphs, nodes and links representing network facilities and 
their communicating elements, for the representation of the structure, properties, and 
response of real systems. The contributions in this thesis included 1) the development 
of the Interdependence Fragility Assessment (IFA) methodology to describe perturba-
tion action, internal damage propagation, and interdependence effects on interacting 
networks; 2) the use of the proposed IFA methodology to test the effects of cascading 
failures and local redundancy enhancement (LRE) on the fragility of interdependent 
networks; 3) test of conceptual fragility mitigation policies such as component fragility 
reduction ( C F R), and interdependence redundancy enhancement (IRE) for interde-
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pendent fragility reduction; and 4) the development of a methodology that combines 
a mechanism to sample probabilistic earthquake hazards with the IFA methodology 
for the generation of unconditional interdependent systemic fragility estimates useful 
for risk assessment and decision making. In additional work independent from the 
results in this thesis, Wu and Duenas-Osorio (2012) applied the IFA algorithm to a 
model of interdependent networks affected by earthquake hazard in the aftermath of 
the 2010 Chile earthquake. The cited work produced supportive outcomes in terms 
of the predictive accuracy of the IFA estimates with respect to the actual levels of 
disruption observed in the real networks. 
The previous developments are explained in more detail in the following para-
graphs. The first development advanced previous research by proposing a numerical 
simulation strategy called Interdependent Fragility Assessment (IFA) algorithm. The 
IFA algorithm simulates internal damage propagation, interdependent damage trans-
mission, and failure feedback between interconnected networks subjected to earth-
quake action. The element of failure feedback was not explored by previous research 
and was shown to have only a marginal influence on test interdependent fragility 
estimates. 
The second development combined the IFA algorithm tool with a strategy to 
model the occurrence of operational cascading failures on infrastructure networks. 
This effort tested the influence of two combined negative effects, interdependence and 
cascading failures, on systemic fragility, and also evaluated the effectiveness of local 
redundancy enhancement (LRE) as a measure of systemic fragility control. Cas-
cading failures and interdependence effects were found to work together to worsen 
fragility estimates when urban networks were exposed to seismic hazards. Also, the 
local redundancy mitigation policy proved to be of limited effect against cascading 
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failures, especially in the event of seismic scenarios of high intensity (Peak Ground 
Acceleration, PGA in the second case study in this thesis). The effect of local re-
dundancy was also limited on its control of global interdependence effects and hence 
alternative mitigation measures were proposed and examined. 
The third work explored mitigation alternatives for interdependent fragility reduc-
tion. Two mitigation strategies were tested: Component Fragility Reduction ( C F R) 
program and Interdependence Redundancy Enhancement (IRE) policies. The ap-
plication of the IRE policy used an alternative interdependent failure propagation 
paradigm for the IFA algorithm. In a critical development, a new paradigm of inter-
dependence propagation, failure avoidance, replaced the original failure transmission 
model and was successful on guiding the reduction of interdependent effects on sys-
temic fragility. Both mitigation strategies produced considerable fragility reductions, 
but the CF R mitigation policy consistently outperformed the IRE policy. Neverthe-
less, C F R + IRE combinations showed comparable outcomes highlighting their po-
tential in terms of investment impact by addressing single system fragility reductions 
as well as interdependence-induced fragility reductions, without being as intensive as 
C F R-only mitigation actions. 
The four and final development combined an existing methodology for sampling 
seismic hazard induced by seismic faults with the IFA algorithm to use probabilistic 
seismic hazard descriptions on the assessment of systemic fragility to facilitate risk-
based decision making. The application of the new hybrid methodology allowed 
the estimation of annual probabilities of exceedance for systemic fragility values. 
The trends and variations observed in the fragility estimations provide unconditional 
information beyond the scope of scenario-based analysis used in previous efforts in 
the field, and make the results informative for life-cycle and other long-term decision 
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making planning, retrofit, and growth evaluations. 
This summary shows new contributions and consolidation of the understanding of 
the factors and interactions likely to have an impact on the fragility of complex urban 
networks. In all these developments the estimation of fragility is the key objective 
and the !FA algorithm is the main synthesizing tool. A detailed review of the !FA 
algorithm's structure as a central contribution of this thesis reveals its key building 
blocks and how such critical portions influenced the developments in this thesis; such 
review is presented below. 
-......__, 
The !FA algorithm fi~ models direct damage created by hazard action; inter-
nal damage propagation iJJ all networks is the next step; while the main procedure 
corresponds to the simulation of interdependence damage propagation. These steps 
I 
are followed by the estimation. of systemic performance, the final product of the sim-
ulation procedure which is used for the generation of systemic fragility estimates. 
Each of these stages contains an operational principle and a set of key assumptions 
explored in detail throughout the thesis. The first stage is associated to the model of 
hazard impacts on network components. Three of the four efforts in this thesis used 
a selection of seismic scenarios which are useful to quantify the impacts of interde-
pendence and the effects of local seismic fragility. However, the fourth contribution 
proposed a hybrid procedure to include fully probabilistic seismic hazard descriptions 
on the study of interdependent systemic fragility. Such studies provide the right type 
of information that decision-makers should use for investment allocations instead of 
the conditional estimates provided by single scenario results. 
The second !FA stage controls internal damage propagation. The original !FA 
algorithm included disconnection failures as an internal mechanism, but the second 
contribution incorporated an important discussion on the issue of cascading failures, 
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a factor assessed before for independent networks but new to the study of the fragility 
of interdependent urban infrastructure. 
The third IFA stage considers interdependence effects. Interdependence is rep-
resented in this thesis using interdependence links connecting nodes in interacting 
systems and establishing a dependence relationship between a master provider node 
in one system and a slave recipient node in an external network. The event of failure 
of the master node in the relationship triggers the potential of observing an external 
node failing due to the elimination of a vital external provider. Such type of failure 
is said to occur due to interdependence effects. Of key importance, an inherently 
negative paradigm, failure transmission, for interdependence simulation used in the 
first two contributions and based on previous research in the field was replaced in 
the third contribution by an alternative paradigm, failure avoidance, that highlights 
the advantages brought by interdependence in terms of alternative supply sources to 
dependent infrastructure nodes. 
The final step of the process of the IFA algorithm is the calculation of systemic 
performance. The objective of such step is the measure of the reduction of systemic 
performance induced by the cumulative action of the previous stages of the IFA al-
gorithm. The way of calculating such reduction in the case studies in this thesis was 
through measuring the reduction of internal connecting paths between the supply and 
consumption nodes of the studied urban networks using a metric called Connectivity 
Loss, CL. Connectivity Loss averages the connectivity reductions experienced by 
consumption nodes in a network after the action of perturbation. The probability of 
reaching or exceeding a CL level determines the fragility of a system to the cumula-
tive action of initial perturbation, internal damage propagation and interdependent 
effects. It should be noted that although all result reported in this thesis used CL, 
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the proposed IFA algorithm is inherently independent of the mechanism selected for 
measuring systemic performance degradation and systemic fragility. 
The previous descriptions show the guiding role of the IFA algorithm in the devel-
opments presented in this work. However, of equal relevance is the discussion of its 
assumptions and limitations. A key feature of the IFA algorithm is its simultaneity 
assumption. This assumption states that the operation of internal systemic update 
occurs in parallel in all analyzed networks, i.e., all processes of systemic update and 
systemic disruption occur at the same time for all networks without any single net-
work leading any of such processes. In a similar manner, failures in external networks 
due to interdependence are stored temporarily during an updating cycle (Section 3.1) 
and are only propagated after all sources of interdependent failures have been exam-
ined. These assumptions ease the comprehension of the updating process as well as its 
computational demand for practical implementation. However, it is possible to con-
sider interdependence interactions in which such assumptions do not hold. Whether 
differences in the relative times of systemic update interdependence failure propaga-
tion have an impact in the assessment of systemic fragility is a matter that demands 
physics-based models including not only an explicit time factor of flow dynamics, but 
also an analysis of the variations of supply and demand for the networks affected 
by seismic hazard. An exploratory work on this subject using seismic scenarios and 
three interacting networks with equal propagation times tested alternative orderings 
in the propagation of interdependent damage finding only marginal differences in the 
resulting fragility estimates; hence, the instantaneous approach could be used as an 
initial interaction description paradigm fragility assessment studies. 
The previous point leads naturally to the issue of the details of systemic char-
acterizations. This thesis represented networks using enriched graph representations 
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capturing the structure of connections between components as well as the individual 
fragilities that are the basic sources of systemic fragility. This representation is both 
efficient and sufficient for first-level analysis of connectivity-based fragility. However, 
public decision-makers and private stakeholders interests may be closer to alternative 
ways of measuring systemic fragility and their forecasts. Probabilistic estimations 
of number of customers affected and their spacial distributions may be a key tar-
get for public decision-makers as such quantities and allocations may influence their 
estimates of expected perceived damage and of the investment amounts required for 
retrofitting and emergency planning. The same type of forecast holds critical value for 
private stakeholders in terms of investment decisions, degree of interaction required 
between utility managers, demands for alternatives supply sources, and the expected 
amount of resources required to revert networks to their original condition after a 
perturbation event. Such outcome types could be modeled to a proper accuracy level 
only by using physics-based models of the typical operational conditions of the net-
works involved in a clearly circumscribed realistic urban scenario. Note that the IFA 
methodology still applies for such models and that the level of detail required at each 
of its steps increases with the demand level requested by the purposes of the analysis. 
The two key challenges of such realistic scenarios are the data requirements and 
the amount of computational resources required. For the first point, it is reasonable 
to expect that such an ambitious analysis could only be executed with the willing 
participation of the different utility administrations involved and hence the issue of 
data requirement would only be a partial obstacle. For the second point, the study 
of systemic response using physics-based models will surely require a considerable 
investment of computational resources used mainly for the purpose of simulation. 
This constraint is clear but given the inherent parallel nature of simulation, the time 
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required to obtain the sought results depends mostly on the development resources 
allocated by the interested parties. 
Finally, and beyond the IFA algorithm and the analysis of interdependent systemic 
fragility, the issue of fragility mitigation links modeling to practice. The fragility 
mitigation measures tested in this study were of two kinds: component intervention 
and interdependent interface intervention. These mitigation types represent indeed 
the basic structures that can be altered in networked systems, but more complex 
techniques may be tested according to the different profiles and interests of a of a 
decision-maker. Targeted survival, for example, is an interesting policy in which 
during a perturbation scenario resources are mobilized from certain zones to support 
others in more critical condition. Hospitals, government offices, and other key facilities 
may be ring-fenced during a scenario through adequate design and retrofitting of key 
points within a network. For each of these mitigation policies a key constraint exists: 
investment efficiency. The assessment of different ways of implementing a policy to 
find out which specific mechanism provides the best cost-benefit ratio is a key goal 
that in order to be achieved requires a clear understanding of the cost-structures of 
the different intervention steps. Furthermore, cost-benefit ratios should be extended 
to include the life-cycle costs of such mitigation mechanisms so that the important 
costs of maintenance and operation are signaled and included in the pre-decision 
assessments. 
Additional topics for future work are: 1) inclusion of an alternative model of 
cascading failures effects based on more realistic flow analysis; 2) analysis of optimal 
intervention strategies including realistic cost structures and life-cycle requirements; 
3) extension of the interdependence model to include the effects of alternative types of 
hazards, like hurricanes or flooding; 4) use of the probabilistic hazard model developed 
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in the fourth contribution for the study of the effectiveness of mitigation policies; and 
5) execution of interdependent systemic fragility studies for theoretical models of 
urban networks. 
Finally, it is worthy to state that currently researchers working in projects in 
the US (Tang et al., 2009) developing standards for the design of interdependent 
lifelines, the EU (Poljansek et al., 2012), studying the interdependent fragility of 
interconnected energy grids, and the UK (Hall et al., 2012), aiming to adequate the 
local infrastructure to future challenges, are likely to adapt the basic ideas proposed 
in this research to gain insights in and benchmark the systemic behavior and response 
of diverse sets of interdependent infrastructure networks. 
135 
References 
Abraham, J. (1979). An improved algorithm for network reliability. Reliability, IEEE 
Transactions on R-28(1), 58-61. 
Adachi, T. and B. R. Ellingwood (2008). Serviceability of earthquake-damaged wa-
ter systems: Effects of electrical power availability and power backup systems on 
system vulnerability. Reliability Engineering f3 System Safety 93(1), 78- 88. 
Adachi, T. and B. R. Ellingwood (2009a). Serviceability assessment of a municipal 
water system under spatially correlated seismic intensities. Computer-Aided Civil 
and Infrastructure Engineering 24 ( 4), 237-248. 
Adachi, T. and B. R. Ellingwood (2009b). Serviceability assessment of electrical power 
transmission systems under probabilistically stated seismic hazards: case study for 
Shelby County, Tennessee. Structure and Infrastructure Engineering 5(5), 343-353. 
Ahuja, R. K., T. L. Magnanti, and J. B. Orlin (1993). Network flows: theory, algo-
rithms, and applications. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
Albert, R., I. Albert, and G. L. Nakarado (2004). Structural vulnerability of the 
North American power grid. Phys. Rev. E 69(2), 025103. 
Albert, R., H. Jeong, and A.-1. Barabasi (2000). Error and attack tolerance of 
complex networks. Nature 406(6794), 378-382. 
136 
Amaral, L. A., A. Scala, M. Barthelemy, and H. E. Stanley (2000). Classes of small-
world networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97(21), 11149-
11152. 
American Society of Civil Engineers, ASCE (2009). Report Card for America's In-
frastructure. American Society of Civil Engineers. 
Amin, M. (2000a). National infrastructures as complex interactive networks. In 
T. Samad and J. Weyrauch (Eds.), Automation, Control, and Complexity: An 
Integrated Approach, pp. 263-286. John Wiley and Sons. 
Amin, M. (2000b). Toward self-healing infrastructure systems. Computer 33(8), 
44-53. 
Arthur, W. B. (1991). Designing economic agents that act like human agents: A be-
havioral approach to bounded rationality. The American Economic Review 81 (2), 
pp. 353-359. 
Barabasi, A.-L. and R. Albert (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. 
Science 286(5439), 509-512. 
Barker, K. and J. R. Santos (2010). A risk-based approach for identifying key eco-
nomic and infrastructure systems. Risk Analysis 30(6), 962-974. 
Barrat, A., M. Barthlemy, and A. Vespignani (2008). Dynamical Processes on Com-
plex Networks. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Bellman, R. (1957). Dynamic Programming. Princeton University Press. 
Bellman, R. (1958). On a routing problem. Quart. Appl. Math. 16, 87-90. 
137 
Bonabeau, E. (2002). Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for simulating 
human systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 99(Suppl 3), 7280-7287. 
Boore, D. M., J. F. Gibbs, W. B. Joyner, J. C. Tinsley, and D. J. Ponti (2003). 
Estimated Ground Motion From the 1994 Northridge, California, Earthquake at 
the Site of the Interstate 10 and La Cienega Boulevard Bridge Collapse, West 
Los Angeles, California. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 93(6), 
2737-2751. 
Brandes, U. (2001). A faster algorithm for betweenness centrality. Journal of Math-
ematical Sociology 25, 163-177. 
Buldyrev, S. V., R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, and S. Havlin (2010). Catas-
trophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. Nature 464, 1025-1028. 
Cadini, F., E. Zio, and C.-A. Petrescu (2009). Using Centrality Measures to Rank the 
Importance of the Components of a Complex Network Infrastructure, pp. 155-167. 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Callaway, D. S., M. E. J. Newman, S. H. Strogatz, and D. J. Watts (2000). Network 
robustness and fragility: Percolation on random graphs. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85(25), 
5468-5471. 
Chang, S., T. McDaniels, J. Mikawoz, and K. Peterson (2007). Infrastructure failure 
interdependencies in extreme events: power outage consequences in the 1998 Ice 
Storm. Natural Hazards 41, 337-358. 
Cohen, R., K. Erez, D. ben Avraham, and S. Havlin (2000). Resilience of the Internet 
to Random Breakdowns. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 4626-4628. 
138 
Cohen, R., K. Erez, D. ben Avraham, and S. Havlin (2001). Breakdown of the Internet 
under Intentional Attack. Phys. Rev. Lett. 86(16), 3682-3685. 
Congress Budget Office (2008). Testimony before the Committee on the Budget and 
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representa-
tives. Technical report, CBO. 
Crowley, H. and J. Bommer (2006). Modelling seismic hazard in earthquake loss 
models with spatially distributed exposure. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering 4, 
249-273. 
Crucitti, P., V. Latora, and M. Marchiori (2004). Model for cascading failures in 
complex networks. Phys. Rev. E 69(4), 045104. 
Crucitti, P., V. Latora, M. Marchiori, and A. Rapisarda (2004). Error and attack 
tolerance of complex networks. Physica A 340, 388-394. 
Davis, T., H. Rogers, C. Shays, H. Bonilla, S. Buyer, S. Myrick, M. Thornberry, 
K. Granger, C. Pickering, B. Shuster, and J. Miller (2006). A Failure of Initiative: 
Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina. Technical report, US House of Representatives. 
Diestel, R. (2005). Graph Theory (Third ed.), Volume 173 of Graduate Texts in 
Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg. 
Dijkstra, E. W. (1959). A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. Numerische 
Mathematik 1, 269-271. 
Duefias-Osorio, 1., J. Craig, and B. Goodno (2007). Seismic response of critical 
139 
interdependent networks. Earthquake Engineering f3 Structural Dynamics 36(2), 
285-306. 
Duenas-Osorio, L. and A. Kwasinki (2010). Quantification of lifeline system interde-
pendencies after the 27 February 2010 Mw 8.8 offshore Maule, Chile earthquake. 
Earthquake Spectra. In press. 
Duenas-Osorio, L. and J. Rojo (2011). Reliability assessment of lifeline systems with 
radial topology. Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering 26(2), 111-
128. 
Duenas-Osorio, L. and S. M. Vemuru (2009). Cascading failures in complex infras-
tructure systems. Structural Safety 31 (2), 157 - 167. 
EERI (2010). The Mw 8.8 Chile Earthquake of February 27, 2010. Tech-
nical report, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. Available online at 
http:/ /bit.ly /dV6hTP. Retrieved on 01/20/2012. 
Ehlen, M. and A. Scholand (2005). Modeling interdependencies between power and 
economic sectors using then-able agent-based model. In Power Engineering Society 
General Meeting, 2005. IEEE, pp. 2842- 2846. 
Eidinger, J., A. Tand, and T. O'Rourke (2010). Report of the 4 September 
2010 Mw 7.1 Canterbury (Darfield), New Zealand Earthquake. Technical re-
port, Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering. Available online at 
http:/ /bit.ly jxOjRui. Retrieved on 01/20/2012. 
Ellingwood, B. R., D. V. Rosowsky, Y. Li, and J. H. Kim (2004). Fragility assess-
ment of light-frame wood construction subjected to wind and earthquake hazards. 
Journal of Structural Engineering 130(12), 1921-1930. 
140 
Elnashai, A., L. Cleveland, T. Jefferson, and J. Harrald (2009). Impact of new madrid 
seismic zone earthquakes on the central usa, val. 1 and 2. Technical report, Mid-
America Earthquake Center. 
Erdos, P. and A. Renyi (1958). On random graphs. Publicationes Mathematicae 
Debrecen 6, 290-297. 
Esposito, S. and I. Iervolino (2011). PGA and PGV Spatial Correlation Models 
Based on European Multievent Datasets. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of 
America 101 (5), 2532-2541. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2003). HAZUS-MH MR4 Technical Man-
ual. Washington D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
Ford, L. R. and D. R. Fulkerson (1956). Maximal flow through a network. Canadian 
Journal of Mathematics 8, 399-404. 
Freeman, L. (1977). A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociome-
try 40(1), 35-41. 
Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification. Social 
Networks 1, 215- 239. 
Gada, K. and H. P. Hong (2008). Spatial correlation of peak ground motions and 
response spectra. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 98(1), 354-365. 
Gomberg, J. and E. Schweig (2006). Earthquake hazard in the heart of the homeland. 
Technical report, U.S. Geological Survey. 
Haimes, Y. and P. Jiang (2001). Leontief-based model of risk in complex intercon-
nected infrastructures. Journal of Infrastructure Systems 7(1), 1-12. 
141 
Hall, J., J. Henriques, A. Hickford, and R. Nicholls (2012). A fast track analysis of 
strategies for infrastructure provision in great britain: Technical report. Technical 
report, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford. 
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu (2003). The Fall of Enron. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17(2), pp. 3-26. 
Hernandez-Fajardo, I. and L. Duenas-Osorio (2011). Sequential Propagation of Seis-
mic Fragility across Interdependent Lifeline Systems. Earthquake Spectra 27(1), 
23-43. 
Hines, P., E. Cotilla-Sanchez, and S. Blumsack (2010). Do topological models pro-
vide good information about electricity infrastructure vulnerability? Chaos 20(3), 
033122. 
Holland, J. H. (2006). Studying complex adaptive systems. Journal of Systems 
Science and Complexity 19(1), 1-8. 
Holme, P., B. J. Kim, C. N. Yoon, and S. K. Han (2002). Attack vulnerability of 
complex networks. Phys. Rev. E 65, 056109. 
Hwang, H. H. M., H. Lin, and M. Shinozuka (1998). Seismic performance assessment 
of water delivery systems. Journal of Infrastructure Systems 4 (3), 118-125. 
Idriss, I. and R. Boulanger (2008). Soil liquefaction during earthquakes. Oakland, 
CA: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. Monograph MN0-12. 
International Energy Agency (2010). Key world energy statistics. Technical report, 
International Energy Agency, lEA. 
142 
Jayaram, N. and J. Baker (2010). Efficient sampling and data reduction techniques for 
probabilistic seismic lifeline risk assessment. Earthquake Engineering & Structural 
Dynamics 39(10), 1109-1131. 
Jayaram, N. and J. W. Baker (2008). Statistical tests of the joint distribution of 
spectral acceleration values. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 98(5), 
2231-2243. 
Jayaram, N. and J. W. Baker (2009). Correlation model for spatially distributed 
ground-motion intensities. Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics 38(15), 
1687-1708. 
Johansson, J. and H. Hassel (2010). An approach for modelling interdependent infras-
tructures in the context of vulnerability analysis. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety 95(12), 1335- 1344. 
Jones, L., R. Bernknopf, D. Cox, J. Goltz, K. Hudnut, D. Mileti, S. Perry, D. Ponti, 
K. Porter, M. Reichle, H. Seligson, K. Shoaf, J. Treiman, and A. Wein (2008). 
The shakeout scenario. Usgs open file report 2008-1150. cgs preliminary report 25. 
version 1.0, U.S. Geological Survey and California Geological Survey. 
Kang, W., J. Song, and P. Gardoni (2008). Matrix-based system reliability method 
and applications to bridge networks. Reliability Engineering System Safety 93(11), 
1584-1593. 
Kim, Y., J. Song, B. Spencer, and A. Elnashai (2010). Seismic risk assessment of com-
plex interacting infrastructures using matrix-based system reliability method. In 
Safety, Reliability and Risk of Structures, Infrastructures and Engineering Systems, 
pp. 2889-2893. Taylor and Francis Group, London. 
143 
Kim, Y., B. Spencer, A. Elnashai, and J. Song (2009). Seismic performance assessment 
of interdependent lifeline systems. International Journal of Engineering Under 
Uncertainty: Hazards, Assessment, and Mitigation 1 (3-4), 173-181. 
Kiremidjian, A., E. Stergiou, and R. Lee (2007). Issues in seismic risk assessment of 
transportation networks, Volume 6, pp. 461 - 480. Springer Netherlands. 
Kroese, D. P., T. Taimre, and Z. I. Botev (2011). Handbook of Monte Carlo methods. 
Wiley, New Jersey. 
Lee, E. E., J. E. Mitchell, and W. A. Wallace (2007). Restoration of services in inter-
dependent infrastructure systems: A network flows approach. IEEE Transactions 
on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C 37(6), 1303-1317. 
Leontief, W. (1986). Input-output economics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Li, J. and J. He (2002). A recursive decomposition algorithm for network seismic 
reliability evaluation. Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics 31 (8), 1525-
1539. 
Liscouski, B. and W. Elliot (2004). Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in 
the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations. Technical report, 
U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force. 
Matrosov, A., E. Rodionov, D. Harley, and J. Malcho (2011). Stuxnet Under The 
Microscope. Technical report, ESET. 
McDaniels, T., S. Chang, K. Peterson, J. Mikawoz, and D. Reed (2007). Empirical 
framework for characterizing infrastructure failure interdependencies. Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems 13(3), 175-184. 
144 
Mei, S., F. He, X. Zhang, S. Wu, and G. Wang (2009). An improved OPA model and 
blackout risk assessment. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on 24 (2), 814 -823. 
Mosleh, A. and G. Apostolakis (1986). The assessment of probability distributions 
from expert opinions with an application to seismic fragility curves. Risk Analy-
sis 6( 4), 447-461. 
Motter, A. E. and Y.-C. Lai (2002). Cascade-based attacks on complex networks. 
Phys. Rev. E 66(6), 065102. 
Newman, M. (2010). Networks: An Introduction. New York, NY, USA: Oxford 
University Press, Inc. 
Nielson, B. and R. DesRoches (2007). Analytical seismic fragility curves for typical 
bridges in the central and southeastern united states. Earthquake Spectra 23(3), 
615-633. 
Nuti, C., A. Rasulo, and I. Vanzi (2007). Seismic safety evaluation of electric power 
supply at urban level. Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics 36(2), 245-
263. 
Orense, R. (2011). Soil liquefaction during the 2010 Darfield and 1990 Luzon Earth-
quakes: A comparative study. In Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Conference on 
Earthquake Engineering Building an Earthquake-Resilient Society. 
O'Rourke, M. and X. Lui (1999). Response of buried pipelines subject to earthquake 
effects. Technical report, MCEER. SUNY Buffalo. 
O'Rourke, M. J. and P. So (2000). Seismic fragility curves for on-grade steel tanks. 
Earthquake Spectra 16(4), 801-815. 
145 
O'Rourke, T. D. (2007). Critical infrastructure, interdependencies, and resilience. 
The Bridge 37(1), 22-29. 
Ouyang, M. and L. Duenas-Osorio (2011a). An approach to design interface topolo-
gies across interdependent urban infrastructure systems. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety 96(11), 1462- 1473. 
Ouyang, M. and L. Duenas-Osorio (2011b). An efficient approach to compute gener-
alized interdependent effects between infrastructure systems. In Journal of Com-
puting in Civil Engineering. Available online. 
Padgett, J. E. and R. DesRoches (2008). Methodology for the development of ana-
lytical fragility curves for retrofitted bridges. Earthquake Engineering & Structural 
Dynamics 37(8), 1157-1174. 
Page, 1., S. Brin, R. Motwani, and T. Winograd (1999). The pagerank citation 
ranking: Bringing order to the web. Technical Report 1999-66, Stanford InfoLab. 
Papoulis, A. (1991). Probability, Random Variables and Stochastic Processes (3rd 
ed.). McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Pederson, P., D. Dudenhoeffer, S. Hartley, and M. Permann (2006). Critical In-
frastructure and Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of US and International 
Research. Technical report, Idaho National Laboratory. 
Poljansek, K., F. Bono, and E. Gutierrez (2012). Seismic risk assessment of interde-
pendent critical infrastructure systems: The case of european gas and electricity 
networks. Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics 41 (1), 61-79. 
146 
Rinaldi, S., J. Peerenboom, and T. Kelly (2001). Identifying, understanding, and 
analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. Control Systems Magazine, 
IEEE 21 (6), 11-25. 
Schoenwald, D., D. Barton, and M. Ehlen (2004). An agent-based simulation lab-
oratory for economics and infrastructure interdependency. In American Control 
Conference, 2004. Proceedings of the 2004, Volume 2, pp. 1295 -1300 vol.2. 
Shinozuka, M., X. Dong, T. C. Chen, and X. Jin (2007). Seismic performance of 
electric transmission network under component failures. Earthquake Engineering 
€3 Structural Dynamics 36(2), 227-244. 
Shinozuka, M., M. Q. Feng, J. Lee, and T. Naganuma (2000). Statistical analysis of 
fragility curves. Journal of Engineering Mechanics 126(12), 1224-1231. 
Shinozuka, M., A. Rose, and R. Eguchi (1998). Engineering and Socioeconomic Im-
pacts of Earthquakes - An Analysis of Electricity Lifeline Disruptions in the New 
Madrid area. Buffalo, N.Y.: Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research, MCEER, Monograph 2. 
Song, J. and A. Der Kiureghian (2003). Bounds on system reliability by linear pro-
gramming. Journal of Engineering Mechanics 129(6), 627-636. 
Song, J. and W.-H. Kang (2009). System reliability and sensitivity under statistical 
dependence by matrix-based system reliability method. Structural Safety 31 (2), 
148- 156. 
Symantec Security Response (2011). W32.Duqu. The precursor to the next Stuxnet. 
Technical report, Symantec. 
147 
Takewaki, I. (2011). Preliminary report of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku 
Earthquake. Journal of Zhejiang University SCIENCE A 12(5), 327-334. 
Tang, A., S. Werner, and A. S. of Civil Engineers. Technical Council on Lifeline 
Earthquake Engineering (2009). TCLEE 2009: Lifeline Earthquake Engineering in 
a Multihazard Environment : June 28-July 1, 2009, Oakland, California. American 
Society of Civil Engineers. 
Ten, C.-W., C.-C. Liu, and G. Manimaran (2008). Vulnerability assessment of cy-
bersecurity for scada systems. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on 23(4), 1836 
-1846. 
The Economist (April 28 2011). America's transport infrastructure. Life in the slow 
lane. http:/ /www.economist.com/node/18620944. 
United Nations (2009). DESA Population Division. World Population Prospects: 
The 2008 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision. 
http:/ jesa.un.orgjwup2009/unupj. Retrieved on January 05 2012. 
Wang, J. and J. Silvester (1993). Maximum number of independent paths and radio 
connectivity. Communications, IEEE Transactions on 41 (10), 1482 -1494. 
Wang, J.-W. and L.-L. Rang (2009). Cascade-based attack vulnerability on the US 
power grid. Safety Science 47(10), 1332 - 1336. 
Watts, D. (2004). Small worlds : the dynamics of networks between order and ran-
domness. Princeton, N.J. Woodstock: Princeton University Press. 
Watts, D. J. (2003). Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (1st ed.). W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
148 
Watts, D. J. and S. H. Strogatz (1998). Collective dynamics of "small-world" net-
works. Nature 393(6684), 440-442. 
Wesson, R. L. and D. M. Perkins (2001). Spatial correlation of probabilistic earth-
quake ground motion and loss. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of Amer-
ica 91 (6), 1498-1515. 
White, D. R. and M. Newman (2001). Fast Approximation Algorithms for Finding 
Node-Independent Paths in Networks. Technical report, Santa Fe Institure Working 
Paper. 
Winkler, J., L. Duenas-Osorio, R. Stein, and D. Subramanian (2011). Interface net-
work models for complex urban infrastructure systems. Journal of Infrastructure 
Systems 17(4), 138-150. 
Wu, J. and L. Duenas-Osorio (2012). Calibration and validation of a seismic damage 
propagation model for interdependent infrastructure systems. In Preparation. 
Youngs, R. and K. Coppersmith (1985). Implications of fault slip rates and earth-
quake recurrence models to probabilistic seismic hazard estimates. Bulletin of the 
Seismological Society of America 75(4), 939-964. 
Zhang, P., S. Peeta, and T. Friesz (2005). Dynamic game theoretic model of multi-
layer infrastructure networks. Networks and Spatial Economics 5(2), 147-178. 
